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Multiproduct firms account for a large fraction of economic activity and ac-
tively change their product mix. This dissertation consists of two chapters studying
the product dynamics of multiproduct firms.
In Chapter 1, I investigate changes in product scope, the number of products
that a firm offers, over the business cycle and decompose the impact of such changes
on aggregate output. I use the Nielsen Retail Scanner data of U.S. consumer goods
purchases for 2007-2014. I find that firm product scope is an important margin of
adjustment. In the recession, firm product scope decreases on average and the de-
creases are heterogeneous across firms. Such product scope changes affect aggregate
consumption and output by changing the total number of products and by affecting
firms’ markups. These impacts are shown in a model featuring heterogeneous mul-
tiproduct firms, oligopolistic competition and free firm entry. Firm and aggregate
outcomes vary in different states of economic activity. In a recession state, lower
average product scope implies a lower number of product varieties, which disin-
centivizes consumption. Additionally, since the most productive firms have higher
market shares, as the data suggests, they charge higher markups as oligopolistic
competitors. The average markup goes up and further decreases consumption.
In Chapter 2, I explore the within-firm product dynamics beyond the product
scope changes. The measures of interest include within-firm product entry, exit,
net entry and reallocation. The net entry is related to the product scope changes
(and is expected to be procyclical), and the reallocation is an important channel
for endogenous growth. To investigate the cyclicality of these measures and locate
the firm-level factors that affect the within-firm product dynamics, I combine the
Nielsen Retail Scanner data with the Compustat fundamental data for the listed
firms, by matching the firm names. The listed Nielsen firms have lower net entry
and reallocation rates in the recession years. The regressions of the net entry and
reallocation rates on the unemployment rate reveal that the net entry is signifi-
cantly procyclical on average and the reallocation is not. Moreover, firms’ financial
constraint condition and R&D significantly affect the reallocation, but not the net
entry.




Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of the
University of Maryland, College Park in partial fulfillment
















I owe my gratitude to all the people who have made this thesis possible and
because of whom my graduate experience will benefit me throughout the year.
First and foremost, I’d like to thank my advisors, John Haltiwanger, Luminita
Stevens, John Shea, and Nuno Limão for the great guidance and comments they
have provided. I am deeply indebted to John Haltiwanger for mentoring me as a
research assistant. He introduced me to firm dynamics and demonstrated the rig-
orous empirical research. His expertise, inspiration and continuous encouragement
have been invaluable. I am grateful to Luminita Stevens. She provides numerous
insightful comments and the generous support in obtaining the Nielsen and GS1
data. I would also like to thank my John Shea for carefully reading every draft of
my primary research and providing extensive feedback to improve the paper. I’d like
to thank Nuno Limão for introducing me to international trade models, on which
the paper heavily draws. I also thank Phillip Swagel for agreeing to serve on my
dissertation committee.
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Chapter 1: Firm Product Scope, Oligopoly Competition and the Busi-
ness Cycle: Evidence and Theory
1.1 Introduction
Multiproduct firms account for a large fraction of economic activity (Bernard
et al. (2010) and Broda and Weinstein (2010)). Moreover, product additions and
subtractions are common at the firm level. Bernard et al. (2010) find that one-half
of firms alter their mix of products every five years and that such product additions
and subtractions are influential in determining both firm and aggregate outcomes.
Building on their results, my study examines within-firm product switching over
a short horizon and investigates its impact on aggregate output over the business
cycle.
In this paper, I document changes in product scope, the number of products
that a firm offers, over the recent business cycle and decompose the impact of
such changes on aggregate output with a quantitative general equilibrium model
of multiproduct firms. I find that firm product scope is an important margin of
adjustment and it is procyclical on average. Such changes affect not only product
varieties available in the market but also firm markups, and through both channels
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affect aggregate consumption and output.
I first investigate the empirical patterns of product scope adjustment, using
Nielsen’s Retail Scanner data on U.S. consumer goods transactions for 2007–2014.1
Large-scale micro-level data with product information, such as the Nielsen data,
became available only recently, and enabled new insights for understanding product
dynamics. The Nielsen data is a good proxy of nondurable goods consumption. The
transactions are at the level of Universal Product Code (UPC or barcode), which
is my definition of a product.2 I assign UPCs to their manufacturers using a data
tool provided by GS1, the registrar of UPCs.3 To explore product group differences
and regional variations, I divide the transactions into different product groups and
regions (i.e., Scantrack markets). The final data contain observations for 1.3 million
UPCs of 36,605 firms and cover 115 product groups of 49 regions in 8 years.
I establish four empirical facts on firm product scope in general as well as
its business cycle properties. The first observation is that the cross-sectional dis-
tribution of firms’ product scope is highly skewed, with the median firm offering 3
products and the largest firm offering 256 products.4
1All empirical results are calculated based on data from The Nielsen Company (US), LLC and
marketing databases provided by the Kilts Center for Marketing Data Center at The University
of Chicago Booth School of Business. Data copyright c© 2018 The Nielsen Company (US), LLC.
All Rights Reserved. The conclusions drawn from the Nielsen data are those of the researchers
and do not reflect the views of Nielsen. Nielsen is not responsible for, had no role in, and was not
involved in analyzing and preparing the results reported herein.
2A product can be defined in different ways. The choice of product definition usually depends on
the data. For example, Bernard et al. (2010) use manufacturing Census data and define a product
as a five-digit SIC category; on the contrary, Broda and Weinstein (2010) use similar Nielsen data
to mine and define a product as a Universal Product Code, which is a more disaggregated product
definition.
3Hottman et al. (2016) also use UPC-level data and map UPCs into manufacturer identifiers
using the GS1 data tool.
4The product scope numbers are averaged across product groups, Scantrack markets and years.
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Second, the product scope adjustment margin is important. In the Nielsen
data, 39% of firms change their product scope annually, whereas only 24% of firms
are new or exiting. About twice as many firms expand or shrink their product
scope as firms that enter or exit the market. This finding is consistent with the
empirical pattern in Broda and Weinstein (2010) that aggregate product additions
and subtractions are much larger than firm entry and exit. Additionally, the product
scope adjustment margin is 4.5 times more important than the firm entry and exit
margin in terms of the contribution to total sales growth.
The third observation is about the variation in product scope over the busi-
ness cycle.5 I show that firm product scope is on average negatively correlated with
the regional unemployment rate, suggesting product scope is procyclical on average.
Broda and Weinstein (2010) has documented the procyclicality of product addi-
tions at the aggregate level.6 However, the aggregate number of products depends
on both the number of firms and the number of products per firm. The procyclicality
of product scope at the firm level is a novel finding that isolates firm-level product
switching from firm entry and exit. Furthermore, product scope adjustment rede-
fines the boundary of firms and changes the size distribution of firms. In particular,
product scope is the most procyclical for medium-sized firms relative to small or
5Axarloglou (2003) is the first study to show the business cycle properties of product intro-
ductions at the firm level, but their findings are based on anecdotal evidence from newspapers.
Decker et al. (2014) also find that U.S. listed firms have more products (or more precisely speaking,
industries, as defined by the four-digit SIC codes) in booms and fewer in recessions than in normal
times. My analysis differs from the previous studies by using UPC-level data and investigating
average firms.
6Both aggregate product additions and product additions net of product subtractions are pro-
cyclical. Very recently, Argente et al. (2018) study product reallocation, defined as additions plus
subtractions, at the aggregate and firm level. The authors find that aggregate product realloca-
tion is strongly procyclical and the cyclical pattern is almost entirely explained by within-firm
reallocation.
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large firms.7 Consistent with the nonlinear response of product scope across firms,
sales changes also vary by firm size. Medium-sized firms shrink more in a recession
and large firms take more market share.
The measured procyclicality in firm product scope can arise because of local
supply shocks that cause firms to adjust their product offerings, or because of local
demand shocks that cause consumers to alter the varieties in their consumption
baskets. The Nielsen data support the idea that some of the observed product scope
changes are due to local supply shocks. To assess the relative strength of the supply
and demand channels, I compare the cyclicality in product scope of local firms that
sell in one region to that of national firms that sell in all regions. Local firms are
affected by both local demand and supply channels. On the contrary, assuming that
national firms can produce anywhere in the nation, their local product scope is only
affected by the demand channel. The Nielsen data confirms that product scope is
more procyclical for local firms than national firms, so product scope changes are
partly driven by local supply shocks and firm-side adjustment. Furthermore, the
result holds true for both medium and large firms.
These findings are obtained using data defined at both the cell and firm level.
A cell is a product group by Scantrack market by year observation. I measure cell-
level data as averages across firms within the cell. For firm-level analysis, I identify
firms within each product group by Scantrack market by year cell. Firm controls
such as size are measured using the Nielsen data and included in the firm-level
7I use a firm’s lagged product scope as the main firm size proxy. Similar results are obtained
using sales instead of product scope. See this robustness check in section 4.5.
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analysis.
To demonstrate the aggregate impacts of the cyclical changes in product scope,
I build a quantitative general equilibrium model of multiproduct firms. The model
features heterogeneous multiproduct firms, oligopolistic competition and free firm
entry. I abstract from any interaction across product groups or regions. Within
a given product group and region, firms that have heterogeneous productivity can
produce multiple differentiated products. A firm’s product scope is determined by a
demand constraint: the benefit to adding a product is the extra profit earned, while
the cost is the cannibalization of profits on existing products. The cannibalization
effect framework was first proposed in Feenstra and Ma (2007) and has empirical
support, e.g., Srinivasan et al. (2005).8 The model features a finite number of firms
who engage in oligopolistic competition, to match the empirical market shares of dif-
ferent firms in my data. I also model endogenous firm entry and exit, which enables
me to compare the product scope adjustment margin and the firm churning margin.
The firms consider all products on the market and endogenously choose their input
demand, product prices, and product scope to maximize profits. In equilibrium,
firms’ choices (i.e., input demand, product prices, product scope) depend on their
productivity. All else being equal, the higher is a firm’s productivity, the higher are
its market share and markup.
I calibrate the model so that the model moments in steady state match the
data. The distribution of firm product scope generated by the model matches well
with the distribution in the data. To decompose the aggregate impact of product
8See Section 2 for a broader discussion of the cannibalization effect model and its alternatives.
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scope changes, I compare two steady states - one capturing normal times and the
other capturing a recession in which average productivity is lower and productivity
dispersion is higher.9
The comparative statics show that changes in product scope affect aggregate
output in two ways. First, firms’ procyclical product scope generates a product
variety effect. In a recession state, firms’ product scope is lower than in normal
times, which means fewer product choices for consumers. Since consumers love
variety, fewer products means a higher aggregate price of consumption relative to
leisure, which disincentivizes consumption and output. This is the direct impact of
procyclical product scope.
In addition to the direct impact, firms’ product scope choices affect their
markups. In a recession state, product scope reoptimization enables the most pro-
ductive firms, which have more advantages relative to other firms as the productivity
dispersion rises, to acquire more market share. Since firms are oligopolistic com-
petitors, higher market share leads to a higher markup. Consequently, the average
markup rises. The countercyclical markup intensifies the increase in the aggregate
price of consumption relative to leisure and further decreases consumption and out-
put. The Nielsen data support the model’s prediction that large firms achieve higher
market shares in recessions.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In section 1.2, I review
the literature on multiproduct firms and firm dynamics over the business cycle. In
9Lower mean productivity and higher productivity dispersion in recessions are supported by
literature, e.g., Kehrig (2015).
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section 1.3, I describe the data and my empirical approach. Section 1.4 reports
the main empirical results and robustness checks. In section 1.5, I build and solve
a general equilibrium model with a finite number of heterogeneous firms that can
enter or exit the market and choose their product scope. In this section, I also
calibrate the model and use it to demonstrate the aggregate impact of changes in
product scope by comparing two steady states. Section 1.6 summarizes.
1.2 Literature Review
My study contributes to the empirical studies on multiproduct firms, of which
examples include Axarloglou (2003), Bernard et al. (2010), Broda and Weinstein
(2010), and Decker et al. (2014). In particular, Broda and Weinstein (2010) investi-
gate ACNielsen Homescan data that record consumer goods purchases in the U.S. for
1994 and 1999–2003. They find that gross and net product additions are procyclical,
while product subtractions are countercyclical. However, aggregate product addi-
tions and subtractions confound firm entry and exit with product switching within
firms. As opposed to Broda and Weinstein (2010), my paper investigates the latter
explicitly and also explores regional variations and identifies firm using the GS1 data.
Broda and Weinstein (2010) also find that there are four times as many product
additions and subtractions as firm entries and exits in terms of sales. This finding
suggests that product switching at the firm level plays at least an equally important
role as firm entry and exit, the latter of which is a well-documented important factor
affecting aggregate dynamics, as discussed later.
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My study is also related to two groups of theoretical studies: models of mul-
tiproduct firms and models of firm dynamics in business cycle analysis. The first
relevant strand of the literature concerns modeling multiproduct firms. One field
that emphasizes multiproduct firms is international trade.10 There are two ways
to constrain a firm’s product scope: demand-side and supply-side factors. The
demand-side constraint arises from the interactions of firms’ products. Feenstra and
Ma (2007) proposes that firms face a clear tradeoff when choosing their number of
products. The positive side of expanding the product range is that firms’ elasticity of
demand falls and their market power increases. The downside is the cannibalization
effect in demand, that is, producing more products cannibalizes the sales of existing
products, because products within and across firms are imperfect substitutes. On
supply-side constraints, for example, Bernard et al. (2010) claim that firms’ choice of
products is contingent on two attributes, one specific to firms and the other specific
to firm–product pairs. In this setting, firms expand their product scope until the
firm product-specific attribute for the marginal product falls below the cutoff level.11
Alternatively, Yeaple (2013) assumes that fixed organizational capital is needed to
produce any product. Firms thus face a tradeoff between more products and higher
productivity. These different ways of modeling multiproduct firms are not mutually
exclusive. For example, Eckel and Neary (2010) allows for the cannibalization effect
10Firms’ product choice is also an important topic in industrial organization and finance. Such
microeconomic studies have focused on firm-level implications rather than aggregate behavior. For
example, Lang and Stulz (1994), Berger and Ofek (1995), and Maksimovic and Phillips (2002))
discuss firms’ performance in financial markets and product scope.
11The model of Bernard et al. (2010) is a natural extension of the widely adopted market and
firm setting studied in Jovanovic (1982), Hopenhayn (1992), Ericson and Pakes (1995), and Melitz
(2003)
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and additionally proposes that firms have a “core competency” in the production of
a particular good.
My model follows Feenstra and Ma (2007), whose model of the cannibalization
effect is consistent with the empirical findings in the marketing literature, such
as Srinivasan et al. (2005). Hottman et al. (2016) also offers empirical evidence
supporting the existence of a cannibalization effect. In this paper, I adopt the
cannibalization effect framework and calibrate the model to match the empirical
distribution of firm size.
The second strand of the literature is related to studies of the endogenous
entry and exit of firms and their implications for business cycles. Firms are often
assumed to produce only one product and firm entry and exit are shown to am-
plify and propagate business cycles. For example, Chatterjee and Cooper (2014)
argue that firm entry determines product additions and that procyclical firm en-
try amplifies aggregate price changes through the product variety effect. Jaimovich
and Floetotto (2008) argue that procyclical firm entry is important because it leads
to countercyclical variations in markups that give rise to endogenous procyclical
movements in productivity. Bilbiie et al. (2012) take firms as a special investment
instrument and consider the return on investment. Since this return rises in booms,
firm entry is procyclical. The study further shows that the sluggish response of the
number of firms generates an endogenous propagation mechanism.
In contrast to the above studies, which assume single-product firms, Minniti
and Turino (2013) investigate the role of homogeneous firms that produce multiple
products. The authors show that lower product scope in a recession decreases ag-
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gregate output by reducing the number of products available in the market. In a
dynamic setting, procyclical product scope changes amplify business cycle shocks.
Different from that paper, I present empirical patterns first and highlight firm het-
erogeneity in both data and model.
Firm heterogeneity has been found to play an important role in linking firm
dynamics and aggregate fluctuations. Ottaviano (2011) discusses the endogenous
procyclical movement in productivity similar to Jaimovich and Floetotto (2008),
but emphasizes the reallocation of market share among firms with different effi-
ciency levels. Lee and Mukoyama (2012) and Clementi and Palazzo (2013) further
highlight the different impacts of aggregate shocks on entrants and existing firms.
The emphasis on firm heterogeneity in discussing the impact of firm entry and exit
is supported by the empirical findings of Foster et al. (2001). My study comple-
ments this research by investigating the heterogeneous responses in product scope
of different firms.
1.3 Data and Empirical Approaches
Nielsen’s Retail Scanner data on consumer goods purchases are reported by
participating retail stores in all U.S. markets at weekly frequency. Between 2007
and 2014, approximately 35,000 grocery, drug, mass merchandiser, and other stores
reported their transactions. Another data set similar similar to Nielsen Retail Scan-
ner but collected at the consumers’ end is the Nielsen Consumer Panel. I choose
Nielsen’s Retail Scanner data over the Consumer Panel because the latter lacks
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retailer information, which prevents researchers from distinguishing the impact of
retailer entry and exit and manufacturer adjustment.12 By using Retail Scanner
data, I can thus keep a balanced panel of stores. The balanced panel used in this
study contains 28,953 stores and accounts for about 90% of all transactions. I do not
distinguish variations across retailers and focus on manufacturer (firm) adjustment
in my analysis.
The transaction data are available at the UPC level. A UPC is defined as a
product. A rule of thumb in firms’ assigning UPCs is that each variation in color,
size or any other main characteristic is labeled by a different UPC. Therefore, each
UPC represents a unique cost and revenue structure. I argue that a UPC is the
real-life counterpart closest to the economic concept of a distinct product.
I retain products that use standard UPCs and drop so-called magnet prod-
ucts that use nonstandard UPCs such as weighted meat, fruit, and vegetables. In
addition, I drop private labels, namely products directly owned by retail stores, the
UPCs of which are masked. The products or UPCs remaining in the sample are
assigned to product groups (e.g., baby food) to address product group composition
changes in the data. This also enables me to control for product group fixed effects
in the regression later. In total, there are 115 product groups.13
The Nielsen data also contain transaction locations. I define geographic units
as Scantrack markets, such as Washington D.C.14 In this way, I can explore regional
12The unbalanced panel also confounds consumers switching stores and manufacturer (firm)
adjustment. As consumers switch to stores (Coibion et al. (2015)) and end up in stores carrying
products of a certain type of manufacturers, the observed product scope might be affected.
13See Appendix B2 for a complete list of the product groups.
14Scantrack market is the most disaggregated level of geographic unit with a counterpart in
the representative Consumer Panel. More specifically, to check the representativeness of Nielsen’s
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variations. There are 49 Scantrack markets with transactions of all product groups
available.
The Nielsen UPC data alone do not produce clear information on manufactur-
ing identity. Although the first several digits of a UPC are company prefix numbers
and uniquely identify its manufacturer, it is not possible to accurately infer manu-
facturer from a UPC directly because the length of the company prefix is variable.15
To link UPCs to their manufacturers, I use the official matches data of UPCs and
their corresponding company prefix numbers from GS1, the standards institution
for UPCs. The list of all the UPCs in the 49 Scantrack markets from 115 product
groups in 2007–2014 are matched with their manufacturer information (identifier
numbers, name, and location), using GS1’s List Match data tool. The ratio of
successful matching is 96%. 36,605 unique firms are identified.
I consider three complications when matching products with their manufac-
turers First, the matches data show the current manufacturer of a given UPC. A
company prefix may be recycled after its owner exits the market or stops paying the
annual renewal registration fee, although this is rare according to GS1. To confirm
that the data capture aggregate firm dynamics well, I check the annual firm entry
and exit rates, which are comparable to Census data. The second complication is
that a firm can have more than one company prefix. I use company name to combine
company prefixes belonging to the same firm. The third complication is that firms
Retail Scanner, I use the consumer panel as a benchmark, because the latter has a projection system
transforming the data to be representative of the corresponding region. The most disaggregated
geographic definition with a projection system in the Consumer Panel is a Scantrack market.
15There was a belief that the first six digits of a twelve-digit UPC represented the manufacturer.
This practice had been abandoned to accommodate a growing number of firms adopting UPCs to
label their products.
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can assign a UPC to a different product over time. To rule out such cases, I drop
UPCs that are grouped into different product modules in different years.16
The main measure of interest is firms’ product scope (PS), the number of
UPCs that a firm offers within a given product group in a given Scantrack market.
To document the empirical patterns of the firm product scope distribution and its
changes over the business cycle, I use two complementary analytical approaches: cell-
based and firm-level analyses. In the cell based approach, a cell is a product group
by Scantrack market by year observation. I use an across-firm average measurement
as the cell-level measurement. For firm-level analysis, I identify firms within the
product group by Scantrack market by year cells. The firms in the final data on
average are active in 2 product groups and sell to 17 Scantrack markets within a
given product group.17 Firm controls such as size are measured using the Nielsen
data and included in the firm-level analysis. Other potential firm controls such as
productivity and age are not available.18
Total sales of the 115 product groups and 49 Scantrack markets serves as a
good proxy of aggregate nondurable goods consumption from the National Income
and Product Accounts (NIPA) over the sample period. Figure 1.1 plots the two time
series in billions of dollars. The solid line represents Nielsen sales and the dashed
16Product module is a lower level of aggregation than product group. For example, baby food is a
product group, while baby food, junior is a product module. The regrouping of UPCs into different
product modules can also result from product module definition changes. However, distinguishing
between UPCs labeling different underlying products and UPCs being regrouped into a different
product module because of a definition change is challenging. Therefore, the rare cases of regrouped
UPCs are dropped.
17The median firm is active in only 1 product group. Within a given product group, the median
number of Scantrack markets that a firm covers is 7.
18In the appendix, I include results with firm age inferred from the Nielsen data.
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line plots NIPA nondurable goods spending against the secondary axis. Nielsen sales
align well with nondurable goods consumption for most years except 2010, when the
former had recovered from the global financial crisis, whereas the latter had not.
The discrepancy is partly because the Nielsen data also include some durable goods,
e.g., small electronics.
1.4 Empirical Findings
I present four facts in this section. First, the cross-sectional distribution of
firm product scope is highly skewed. Second, within-firm product scope changes are
an important margin of adjustment. Third, product scope is procyclical on average,
and the changes are heterogeneous across firms of different size, defined by their
last-period product scope. Fourth, part of the product scope changes are directly
due to firm-side adjustment. I also conduct two robustness checks at the end of the
section.
1.4.1 Highly Skewed Distribution
Table 1.1 shows the summary statistics of firms grouped by cells. There are
45,080 Scantrack markets by product group by year cells. The table documents
firms’ product scope as the number of UPCs a firm sells within a cell, and firm
sales as a share of total sales within a cell. I also report the total number of firms
and total sales in a cell to keep track of aggregate activity. The values in the third
(fourth) column are averages (standard deviations) of cell-level moments across the
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45,080 cells. Since the mean product scope is much larger than the median, the
distribution of firms’ product scope is highly skewed. The distribution features a
large number of firms with a few products and some exceptional firms with large
product scope. In terms of firms’ sales’ share, most firms are small while some have
non-trivial market shares. This is consistent with the product scope observation. It
is reasonable to assume that firms that have high market share behave strategically.
The skewness of the distribution of firms’ product scope is confirmed in the
histogram shown in Figure 1.2. About 67% of firms have more than one product.
The largest firms have more than 100 products.
1.4.2 Firm Dynamics and Product Scope Adjustment
How important is the product scope adjustment margin relative to the firm
entry and exit margin? Table 1.2 presents the shares of all firms that are new
firms, exiting firms, and continuing firms with expanding, shrinking, and unchanged
product scope. For each pair of years in the sample period, a firm is an entrant
(exiter) if it only has sales in the next (base) year. Since reentry is rare, I argue
that this serves as a reasonably good proxy of actual firm entry and exit. The firm
ratios reported are the averages across product group by Scantrack market by year
observations.
While about 24% of firms are new or exiting firms, about 39% change their
product scope. Specifically, 1.5 (1.8) times as many firms expand (shrink) their
product scope compared with firms that enter (exit) the market: 17.7% versus 12%
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(21.7% versus 12.3%). Note that the annual firm entry and exit rates are com-
parable to but slightly higher than Census data: Dunne et al. (1988) report the
average industry-level five-year entry (exit) rate of manufacturing firms is 30.7%–
42.7% (30.8%–39%) between Census years for 1963–1982, which puts the annual
entry (exit) rate in the range of 10%. If the entry and exit firm ratios are overes-
timated in my data, the product scope adjustment margin is even more important
relative to the firm entry and exit margin than indicated by my data. Moreover,
since new and exiting firms have lower sales than continuing firms in general, the
shares of sales accounted for by entrants and exiters are even smaller.
Table 1.3 further shows sales growth and weighted sales growth by different
firm types, to decompose the growth of total sales into contributions from firm entry
and exit and product scope adjustment.19 The first row shows the average contribu-
tions of firm types across the sample years. On average, total sales growth is -0.11%,
which equals the sum of 0.72% (entrants), -0.20% (exiters), 2.41% (firms expanding
product scope), -2.67% (firms shrinking product scope), and -0.38% (firms with un-
changed product scope). In terms of sales growth contribution, the product scope
adjustment margin is 4.5 times more important than the firm entry and exit margin.
Table 1.3 also reports the decomposition by pairs of years, which are represented
by the second year in a pair. The contributions of different firm types vary year by
year, but the product scope adjustment margin is always more important than the
19The growth rates in this study are all constructed in the Davis-Haltiwanger-Schuh fashion if not
otherwise specified, i.e., growth= salest−salest−10.5×(salest+salest−1) . This growth rate can account for entering




The summation of weighted sales growth across all five types equals total sales growth.
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firm entry and exit margin.20
1.4.3 Cyclicality of Firms’ Product Scope
I use both cell-based and firm-level analyses to investigate the cyclicality of
firms’ product scope. For the cell-based approach, I use the across-firm average
measurement as the cell-level measurement. The business cycle indicator is the
regional unemployment rate for the Scantrack market. Procyclicality (countercycli-
cality) means a negative (positive) correlation of the firms’ product scope measure
with the unemployment rate. The correlation is computed by using the following
regression equation:
ygrt = αg + ψr + ωt + βURrt + εgrt, (1.1)
where ygrt is the growth rate of firms’ average product scope in a given cell of
product group g, Scantrack market r, and year t. I choose the growth rate as
the main dependent variable because the aggregate product scope levels of many
product groups have a time trend. The main control on the right-hand side is
the unemployment rate at the Scantrack market by year level.21 The right-hand
side also has fixed effects for product group, Scantrack market, and year. Since
different product groups might have different time characteristics, I also consider the
interaction fixed effects of product group and year. Notably, the regression reveals
20In Appendix A1, I present the correlations of total sales growth with firm number growth and
average product scope growth, respectively.
21A Scantrack market contains several counties. The local unemployment rate is the average
across all the counties in a given market.
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the correlation between growth in average product scope and the business cycle
indicator, but does not necessarily establish a causal relationship. The standard
errors for the regression estimates are clustered at the level of Scantrack market.
Column (1) of Table 1.4 shows the baseline regression result for the growth
rate of average product scope. The regional unemployment rate has a significant
and negative effect on the growth rate of average product scope, meaning that firms’
product scope is procyclical on average. When the unemployment rate increases by
1%, average product scope growth decreases by 0.23%. Although not shown explic-
itly, this remains true when controlling for the interaction fixed effect. Addition-
ally, if I add an interaction of recession years with the unemployment rate, average
product scope growth is still negatively correlated with the unemployment rate in
non-recession years, and slightly more so in the two recession years. Column (2)
uses the change in the unemployment rate as the business cycle indicator to account
for the fact that unemployment is often a lagged indicator of the business cycle (i.e.,
it peaked after the trough of the Great Recession). The strong negative correlation
between average product scope growth and the change in the unemployment rate
confirms the procyclicality of the former.22
In addition to the cell-based analysis, I can further run the following firm-level
regression to explore firm variations:
ym,grt = αg + ψr + ωt + βURrt + controlsm,grt−1 + εmgrt, (1.2)
22Here, all firms, including entrants and exiters, are included to construct the cell-level measure-
ment. In the robustness checks in Section 4.5, I show the results using only continuing firms.
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where m denotes the firm, g the product group, r the Scantrack market, and t the
year. The primary firm-level control is a firm size indicator.23 A firm is “Small”
if it is an entrant or its lagged product scope in logs is in the first tercile. A
“Medium” (“Large”) firm’s lagged product scope in logs is in the second (largest)
tercile. Specifically, the first tercile means less than the 34th percentile and the
second tercile means less than the 67th percentile. Typically, a 34th percentile firm
has one product, while a 67th percentile firm has five. As a robustness check, results
using a sales-based firm size indicator are discussed section 1.4.5.
I run the regression using both the log level and the growth rate of firms’
product scope as the dependent variable for 2008–2014.24 The standard errors for
the regression estimates are clustered at the level of Scantrack market. Columns (1)
and (2) of Table 1.5 summarize the results. Both the log of firms’ product scope and
the product scope growth rates are negatively correlated with the unemployment
rate, though the estimated coefficients are not statistically significant.
As documented in the firm dynamics literature, firms of different size respond
to the same business cycle in different magnitude (Fort et al. (2013)). In my study,
this suggests that the correlation with the regional unemployment rate may differ
by firm size. I test this hypothesis including interaction terms of the above firm size
indicators and the regional unemployment rate in the regression equation. Column
(3) of Table 1.5 reports the differentiated coefficients. Small firms’ product scope is
on average negatively and significantly correlated with the regional unemployment
23Other firm-level controls that I experiment with include an indicator of the number of markets
that the firm accesses (section 4.4) and inferred firm age (appendix).
24The year 2007 is available for the log(PS) regression. Including it only slightly changes the
coefficient.
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rate. Below, however, I show that small firms’ product scope is no longer significantly
procyclical if we look only at continuing firms. The difference is driven by the new
entering firms. In other words, firms entering the market in bad times are typically
smaller in product scope than in normal times, while the continuing small firms’
product scope doesn’t change much because they have few products. In contrast,
the responses of medium-sized and large firms are largely driven by continuing firms’
product scope changes. On average, medium-sized (large) firms’ product scope is
procyclical (acyclical).
Regression (1.2) can also be estimated on firm-level sales. Table 1.6 reports
the firm-level regression results for firm sales, similar to those reported in Table 1.5
for firms’ product scope. Columns (1) and (2) show that firm sales are procyclical
on average, although the response is statistically significant only for the log level of
sales. Since firms of different size adjust their product scope in different ways over
the business cycle, their sales are also likely to be affected by the regional unemploy-
ment rate differently. Column (3) confirms this conjecture. Small firms’ sales are
most procyclical, medium firms’ sales are moderately procyclical, and large firms’
sales respond the least. Combining the product scope and sales regression results,
although the product scope levels of small and medium-sized firms decrease by the
same amount when a recession hits, small firms lose more sales than medium-sized
firms. This suggests that the sales per product of small firms are also procyclical
and more so than the sales per product of medium-sized firms. Large firms are most
recession-proof and acquire more market share in recessions than in normal times.
Since large firms are most likely to have high productivity, the data suggests that
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the most productive firms acquire more market share in a recession. Table 1.15 in
Appendix A2 directly confirms this conjecture.
1.4.4 Firms’ Product Scope Changes: Supply or Demand Driven?
Changes in firms’ product scope over the business cycle could be due to con-
sumers changing products in their shopping basket or firms switching their products.
Local firms are affected by both local consumer demand changes and local supply
shocks, whereas national firms’ local product scope is only affected by the demand
channel assuming they can produce anywhere in the country. Therefore, local firms’
product scope should be more procyclical than that of national firms, and their
difference is the contribution of local supply shocks. While national firms could also
be subject to local supply shocks such as distribution cost increases, they are likely
to be less sensitive to local supply conditions because they do not set up production
facilities in every market they access. Some of national firms’ cost shocks should be
orthogonal to the idiosyncratic conditions of the local market.
To distinguish local from national firms most clearly, I look at a subsample
including only local firms selling in only one region and national firms operating in
all 49 regions. This leaves me with 1,585 firms. On average, 62% (38%) of these
firms are local (national). I extend the above firm-level regression by adding a local
firm indicator and its interaction with the regional unemployment rate.25
Table 1.7 reports the firm-level regression results when interacting the business
25I also run the cell-based regression in equation (2.4) for national and local firms respectively,
finding that the local business cycle indicator has a larger impact on local firms than on national
firms.
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cycle indicator with not only the firm size indicator but also the dummy variable
for local firms. Column (1) is the baseline firm-level regression with firm size fixed
effects and the interaction term of the firm size indicator and the regional unem-
ployment rate. Small firms’ product scope is now on average positively although
insignificantly correlated with the regional unemployment rate. This is partly be-
cause of a cleansing effect taking place at the firm entry and exit margin: small
firms entering or remaining in bad times on average have higher product scope
than normal times and are likely to be more productive than exiters. In contrast,
the responses of medium-sized and large firms are more driven by firms’ product
scope changes. On average, medium-sized (large) firms’ product scope is procyclical
(acyclical). Column (2) of Table 1.7 shows the local and national difference, while
allowing for firms of different sizes to respond to the same business cycle differently.
The cleansing effect is shown in the responses of small firms. This effect is stronger
for local firms than national ones. For medium-sized and large firms, their negative
coefficients for the interaction terms of firm size, local firm, and the unemployment
rate (-0.01 and -0.12 for medium-sized and large firms, respectively) suggest that
local firms are affected more by local unemployment than national firms, which
suggests an important role for local supply shocks.
1.4.5 Robustness checks
In this subsection, I discuss two robustness checks. I examine average product
scope changes of continuing firms only, and I adopt an alternative firm size measure
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for the firm-level regressions. More robustness checks are provided in the Appendix.
1.4.5.1 Continuing Firms Only
To isolate the impact of firm entry and exit on firms’ average product scope, I
build an alternative dataset that contains only continuing firms in pair-wise years.
I re-run the cell-based and firm-level regressions for these continuing firms. The
results in Table 1.8 are similar to those in Table 1.4 in that average product scope
is procyclical among continuing firms.
The firm-level estimates for firm product scope and sales are shown in Tables
1.9 and 1.10 respectively. Without the entering firms, small firms’ product scope
is no longer significantly procyclical. This is because small firms are more likely to
completely exit the market, i.e. responding at the firm entry and exit margin, when
the recession hits. Although small continuing firms’ product scope doesn’t change
much over the business cycle, their sales are still the most procyclical. Small firms’
sales per product must have decreased dramatically in bad times and by more than
for other firms.
1.4.5.2 Alternative Firm Size Measure
Firm size can be alternatively measured by a firm’s lagged log sales, instead
of lagged log product scope. Similar to the construction of the firm size indicator in
Section 4.3, a firm is considered “Small” if it is an entrant or if its lagged log sales are
in the first tercile. A “Medium” firm’s lagged log sales are in the second tercile and
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a “Large” firm’s lagged log sales are in the largest tercile. Table 1.11 reports similar
regression results to those in columns (1) and (2) of Table 1.5. The procyclicality
of firms’ product scope on average is robust to the use of this alternative firm size
indicator. Additionally, column (3) demonstrates that firms respond to the local
unemployment rate differentially by firm size: small firms have the most procyclical
product scope. Table 1.15 reports the regression results for firm sales. Similar to
the results using product scope as the size indicator, the small firms’ sales are most
procyclical. The medium-sized firms’ responses to the business cycle are moderate
and the large firms’ reactions in sales are insignificant.
1.5 The Model
To study how firms decide their product scope and how product scope changes
affect aggregate output, I build a general equilibrium model in which heterogeneous
firms are free to enter and exit the market and to choose their number of products.
The model abstracts from product group or region interactions. Since firms in a
given product group and region can have nonnegligible sales shares and can use the
market power to their advantage, I adopt a market structure in which firms behave
as oligopolists by assuming a finite number of firms. There are two groups of players
in the model: one representative household and a finite number of manufacturing
firms. The household supplies labor and purchases the products supplied by firms.
Firms use labor in production. Each of them produces a unique and mutually
exclusive set of goods.
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I solve the model and calibrate it to match some data moments. Then, to
demonstrate how product scope changes in a recession and decompose the aggregate
impact of such product scope changes, I conduct comparative statics by comparing
a normal times steady state versus a steady state with recession features.
1.5.1 Household
The representative household supplies L units of labor at wage rate w and
maximizes her expected intertemporal utility Et
∑∞
s=t β
s−tUs, where β ∈ (0, 1) is
the subjective discount factor. The period utility function takes the form







where Ct is aggregate consumption in period t, χ > 0 is a preference parameter, and
ξ > 0 is the Frisch elasticity of labor supply.
The household finances her consumption using labor income, risk-free bonds
B with interest rate r, and the profits of all the firms she owns Π. Her budget
constraint in period t is PtCt +Bt+1 = (1 + rt)Bt + wtLt + Πt.

















Since I am interested in consumption, which equals output in equilibrium, and
its price, I let the wage rate be the numeraire, i.e. wt = 1 in (1.5) and what follows.
Aggregate consumption Ct is an aggregator of differentiated products in dif-
ferent markets. Suppose there are G groups of products and R markets. I adopt




νgr , where Qgrt is the production of product group g in market
r in time t and νgr is the expenditure share on product group g and market r. This
functional form is chosen because Hottman et al. (2016) find that product group ex-
penditure shares are relatively constant over time. The production decisions across
product groups are hence independent of each other.26 In what follows, I focus on
a given product group in a given market, and the g and r subscripts are suppressed
for notational simplicity.
Within a product group in a given market, the number of firms is finite and
denoted as M . A firm denoted by m produces Nm products. A product is denoted
by two indices, firm m and product i. Suppose that the elasticities of substitution
across and within firms are the same and denote both by η > 1.27 The total final
26In contrast to the Cobb–Douglas function, a CES aggregator would allow potential interactions
across product groups. This could be an extension in future research.
27An extension is to consider different elasticities of substitution across and within firms. For
example, Hottman et al. (2016) estimate a higher elasticity within than across firms.
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where Mt is the number of firms, qmt is the production of all the products of firm
m, λmt is the quality or taste attribute associated with firm m, and qmit is the
production of product i of firm m.

















, where pmit is the
price of product i of firm m.
Cost minimization implies that the quantity of product i produced by firm m



























There is a large number of potential firms compared with the number of firms
that actually enter the market each period that live only one period. Before entry, all
potential firms are identical and face a sunk cost of fE units of labor. A proportion
of this sunk cost can be thought of as the periodic renewal fee of the company prefix
number and its UPCs, which are registered with the barcode regulation institution
GS1. Upon paying the sunk cost, each firm gets a draw of firm-specific productivity
φmt. Firm m then chooses its input demand, product prices and product scope to
maximize profit. It takes the input cost as given and faces a fixed cost of fV units of
labor for every product it produces. By backward induction, I first solve the profit
maximization problem and then examine which firms enter the market.
1.5.2.1 Input Choice, Pricing, and Product Scope
Assume that firm m’s production function of product i is qmit = φmtlmit, where
lmit is the labor employed. By taking residual demand qmit and the cost of labor as






(pmitqmit − lmit)−NmtfV , (1.11)
subject to the demand function given in equation (1.9) and φmtlmit ≥ qmit.
Denote µmit as the shadow price or marginal cost of producing product i in
period t. I find µmit = µmt = 1/φmt. The optimal demand for labor is lmit = µmtqmit.
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Although the firm can choose a separate pricing rule for each product, the
optimal price turns out to be the same across products:
pmit =
η − (η − 1)smt





where εmt ≡ η − (η − 1)smt, the elasticity of substitution perceived by firm m.
Apparently, for smt > 0, the perceived demand elasticity εmt is lower than the
demand elasticity in the eyes of the household η as a result of the oligopolistic market
structure.28 Moreover, the higher the sales share smt, the lower is the perceived
elasticity and the higher is the markup.
Since the prices of and thus demand for all the products produced by firm
m are the same, I denote them by pImt and q
I
mt. The firm’s profit maximization




mt − µmt)−NmtfV . The first-
order condition with respect to Nmt yields
qImt(p
I
mt − µmt)− smtqImt(pImt − µmt) = fV . (1.13)
The first term is the gain in profits from the marginal product and the second term
is the loss in the profits of existing products (i.e., the cannibalization effect). It is
clear that the larger the sales share, the larger is the cannibalization effect.
The implied optimal product scope depends on aggregate revenue R(≡ PC)
28An oligopolistic structure is not the only scenario under which the price depends on the market
share. Another scenario considers a polynomial utility function. For a general discussion, see Mayer
et al. (2016).
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and the firm’s sales share:
Nmt =
smt(1− smt)




The firm’s sales share in turn depends on the firm’s productivity and the
productivity and sales share of the marginal producing firm denoted by subscript 1
(implied by equations (1.9), (1.12), and (1.14)):
smt = s (φmt, φ1t, s1t) = 1−
1






η − η + 1
, (1.15)
where φ̃mt ≡ λmtφmt is the quality-adjusted productivity of firm m.
Equation (1.15) indicates that a firm’s sales share always increases in its pro-
ductivity relative to the marginal firm, all else being equal. However, from equation
(1.14), the optimal product scope does not necessarily increase in relative produc-
tivity. Product scope increases in relative productivity only when the corresponding
sales share is not too large, which is the region of interest. When a firm becomes
more productive relative to the marginal firm and its sales share is not too large,
equation (1.13) shows that the gain from the profits of the marginal product dom-
inates the cannibalization effect. Hence, expanding product scope is preferable. If
the sales share is too large, the cannibalization effect dominates. The model is thus
calibrated so that product scope increases in relative productivity.
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1.5.2.2 Entry Decision
Once the firm has determined the optimal product scope and price of each
product, its maximized profit is
πmt =
s2mtRt
η − (η − 1)smt
. (1.16)
The profit increases in sales share smt.




m=1 πmt] with πmt = 0 if φmt < φ1t. Firms will keep entering the market




m=1 πmt] ≥ fE
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, until the expected profit from having one more entrant










Following Feenstra and Ma (2007), I define the unique equilibrium as follows:
Definition The equilibrium is achieved if








m=1 πmt] < f
E, where πmt is given by equation (1.16);
(2) Given M et , there are Mt active firms and the marginal firm is determined by∑Mt
m=1 smt = 1, where smt is given in equation (1.15);
(3) Firms maximize profits according to equations (1.12) and (1.14);
(4) Consumers maximize utility according to equations (1.4) and (1.5), and the
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budget constraint, given the aggregate price index in equation (1.8);
(5) The goods, labor, and bonds markets clear:




η − (η − 1)smt
+MEt f
E, Bt = 0. (1.17)
1.5.4 The Aggregate Price Index
It is convenient to refer to the aggregate price index when thinking of how
























The price index is the price of consumption relative to leisure. If the price index is
high, consumers will be incentivized to substitute consumption with leisure. As a
result, output decreases. A procyclical number of firms (Mt), procyclical product
scope (Nmt), and countercyclical markups (
εmt
εmt−1) all imply a higher price index in
recessions, which disincentivizes consumption. The latter two interact because the
most productive firms acquire more market share and charge higher markups in a
recession, partly because they reoptimize their product scope.
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1.5.5 Calibration
The model is calibrated to show the impact of product scope changes quanti-
tatively. I assume that quality-adjusted productivity φ̃mt ∈ [φ, φ̄] is drawn from a
Pareto distribution with shape parameter γ. There are nine parameters to calibrate,
as summarized in Table 1.13.
The values of the first two parameters are taken from the literature. The Frisch
elasticity of labor supply ξ is 2, which is a common macro-level estimate (e.g., Smets
and Wouters (2007)). The elasticity of substitution across firms is set to 3.9, the
median estimate in Hottman et al. (2016). The lower bound of quality-adjusted
productivity is normalized to 1.
I interpret periods as years and set the discount factor β = 0.96 so that the
annual interest rate is 4% as in King and Rebelo (1999). The preference parameter
for labor χ is set to be 8 so that steady-state labor supply is about one-quarter of
the available time, as in King and Rebelo (1999). The remaining four parameters
(productivity shape parameter and upper bound, fixed cost per product, and entry
cost) are chosen such that the following targets are matched: average product scope
(13), average product scope weighted by sales (130), median product scope (3), and
overhead labor ratio (0.5). Table 1.13 shows that the model matches the targets
reasonably well.
Figure 1.3 plots the distribution of firms’ product scope in the data (left) and in
the model (right). The product scopes are adjusted by dividing by average product
scope. For the data, the average is cell-based. The model generated distribution
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matches the data well.
1.5.6 Aggregate Impact of Product Scope Changes
The model in this paper is in essence static, and I use comparative statics to
demonstrate different states of economic activity.29 To demonstrate how product
scope changes in a recession and to decompose the aggregate impact of such product
scope changes, I compare a normal times steady state computed using the bench-
mark calibrated parameter values to a “recession” steady state implied by changes
in benchmark parameter values. In recessions, average productivity is lower but
productivity dispersion is higher than in normal times (Kehrig (2015)).30 A simul-
taneous decrease in the upper and lower bounds of the quality-adjusted productivity
distribution can produce such patterns.
I set the recession productivity range to [1 − d, 1.6 − d] where d = 0.0378,
such that output decreases by 3.5%, an output drop similar in magnitude to that
during the Great Recession. The second column of table 1.14 reports changes in key
aggregate and firm-level variables when moving from normal times to a recession.
While the number of firms doesn’t change, product scope affects aggregate output
in two ways. First, firms have lower product scope in the recession steady state,
which means fewer product choices for consumers and a higher aggregate price of
consumption relative to leisure (i.e., the aggregate price index in (1.18) is higher).
29A dynamic model is not a trivial task in my setting because there is a finite number of firms.
Modeling the dynamic game played among the firms requires solving an “oblivious equilibrium”
introduced in Weintraub et al. (2008). To my knowledge, such a dynamic game has not been
considered in macroeconomic literature.
30The Kehrig (2015) findings may be driven by endogenous changes in dispersion in productivity.
The current way of modeling a shock is not exclusive.
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This is the direct impact of procyclical product scope. Second, firms’ product scope
choices interact with their markups. In the recession steady state, the most pro-
ductive firms acquire more market share by reoptimizing input demand, prices, and
product scope. Higher market share implies a higher markup. Consequently, the
average markup rises, and this further decreases consumption. The changes in the
market shares of top firms are consistent with the empirical results on the differential
effects of regional unemployment on firm sales by firm size.
The next column in Table 1.14 documents the changes in the steady-state val-
ues generated by an alternative multiproduct firms model with fixed product scope.
A recession steady state is obtained by decreasing the productivity range by the
same magnitude as in the baseline case. Comparing the results of the full model
and the one with fixed product scope, the two generate similar aggregate impacts.
When only the firm entry and exit margin is present, the number of firms declines
considerably in the recession state. In contrast, when the firm entry and exit margin
and the product scope adjustment margin are both present, the latter dominates.
From the view of the model, this is because a firm can have infinitely small prod-
uct scope and still survive. Indeed, only when shocks are sufficiently large will the
marginal firm exit. The dominance of the product scope margin, nevertheless, is
consistent with data observations. This implies that one cannot measure aggregate
product dynamics over the business cycle simply by firm dynamics. Neglecting prod-
uct scope adjustment underestimates aggregate product dynamics and its aggregate
impact.
The last column in Table 1.14 reports the comparative statics using the model
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of fixed product scope and targeting the same change in total product number
instead of the same shock as in full model. The full model generates about one
third more consumption decrease than the model of fixed product scope.
1.6 Conclusion
By using Nielsen’s Retail Scanner data on U.S. consumer goods purchases
for 2007–2014, the paper describes multiproduct firms’ product scope and makes
four main observations. First, the distribution of firms’ product scope is highly
skewed. Second, product scope adjustment is important. Third, firms’ product
scope is procyclical on average. Moreover, large firms among firms of all sizes are the
most resilient in a recession, in terms of both product scope and sales adjustments.
Fourth, the procyclical changes in product scope are partly driven by local supply
shocks.
In addition, I build a general equilibrium model of multiproduct firms that
can produce similar patterns to the data and compare a normal times steady state
with a recession steady state. I find that firms optimally choose lower product scope
in the second steady state. Holding fewer product varieties decreases consumption
directly because consumers love variety. In the mean time, the reoptimized product
scope helps large firms acquire more market share and charge higher markups to
make use of their higher market power. The resulting average markup rises, which
further decreases consumption.
Both the data and the model suggest that the product scope adjustment mar-
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gin dominates the firm entry margin. Therefore, neglecting the former and only
focusing on the firm entry margin would result in underestimated product dynamics
in a recession.
Further exploration will involve identifying empirical patterns by using a broader
definition of product (i.e., grouping UPCs of the same brand, size, color, shape, and
packaging into one product). This broader definition requires an in-depth discus-
sion of the key characteristics of a product and will allow us to separate out major
changes in products from minor adjustments that are more volatile but less influ-
ential. Moreover, the rich information on price in the Nielsen data is called for
more investigation. For example, firm and product dynamics might affect the fre-
quency and magnitude of price adjustment. In addition to these future empirical
studies, I will extend the model by using different elasticities of substitution across
and within firms to match heterogeneity across and within firms. To account for
the small firms with only one product in data, I will also include a ”residual firm”,
which will address the large impact of firm entry and exit on firm-level averages.
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Tables and Figures
Figure 1.1: Total Sales in the Nielsen Data vs. Nondurable Goods Consumption
Source: Nielsen Retail Scanner data (left-axis) and the NIPA (right-axis).
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Table 1.1: Summary Statistics
Obs. Mean St. Dev.
Product scope
mean 45,080 13.472 13.624
10%ile 45,080 1.030 0.292
median 45,080 3.290 3.634
90%ile 45,080 31.925 39.184
Firm sales (ratio over total sales)
mean 45,080 0.027 0.078
10%ile 45,080 0.005 0.070
median 45,080 0.008 0.075
90%ile 45,080 0.064 0.140
Firm number 45,080 119 109
Total sales 45,080 22M 34M
Notes: Observations are at the product group by Scantrack market by year level. Product
scope is defined as the number of products that a firm offers. Total sales are in millions.
The values in the third (fourth) column are averages (standard deviations) across the
45,080 cells.
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Figure 1.2: Histogram of Firms’ Product Scope
Notes: The histogram pools over all firms across different product groups, Scantrack
markets and years. Product scope on the x-axis is defined as the number of products that
a firm offers in a single cell. The y-axis shows the percentage of firms in each range of
product scope.








Notes: For each pair of years in 2007–2014, a firm is an entrant (exiter) if it only has sales
in the next (base) year. The firm shares reported are the averages across product group
by Scantrack market by year observations.
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Table 1.3: Decomposition of Total Sales Growth
Total Entrants Exiters Continuing firms
Expanding Shrinking Others
Across-year average -0.11 0.72 -0.20 2.41 -2.67 -0.38
Year-pair
2008 3.08 0.64 -0.16 3.48 -1.10 0.21
2009 -2.24 0.70 -0.19 1.56 -3.71 -0.61
2010 -1.32 0.60 -0.19 2.17 -3.51 -0.39
2011 2.14 0.63 -0.21 3.60 -1.71 -0.18
2012 -1.18 0.82 -0.16 1.89 -3.05 -0.67
2013 -0.52 0.70 -0.20 2.56 -3.09 -0.48
2014 -0.74 0.94 -0.27 1.65 -2.53 -0.53
Notes: Growth rates are in percentages. For each pair of years in 2007–2014 (represented
by the second year), a firm is an ”Entrant” (”Exiter”) if it only has sales in the next
(base) year. Continuing firms have three types: expanding product scope (”Expanding”),
shrinking product scope (”Shrinking”) and product scope unchanged (”Others”). The
growth rates by firm type are weighted by their sales shares. The growth rates reported
are averaged across product groups and Scantrack markets.
Table 1.4: Cyclicality of Average Product Scope: Cell-based Approach
(1) (2)





Product group fixed effects Yes Yes
Region fixed effects Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes
R2 0.0928 0.0929
Observations 39,445 39,445
Notes: ∗p < 0.1, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01. Standard errors are clustered at the Scantrack
market level. In the cell-based approach, a cell is a product group by Scantrack market by
year observation. I use an across-firm average measurement as the cell-level measurement.
The dependent variable is the growth of average product scope. The main independent
variable in column (1) is the regional unemployment rate, and the alternative in column
(2) is its change.
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Table 1.5: Cyclicality of Firms’ Product Scope: Firm-level Analysis
(1) (2) (3)









Product group fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Region fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Firm size fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.8224 0.4098 0.8224
Observations 4700177 4700177 4700177
Notes: ∗p < 0.1, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01. Standard errors are clustered at the Scantrack
market level. Growth rates are in percentages. A firm is “Small” if its lagged log(PS)
is in the first tercile or the firm is a new entrants, “Medium” if lagged log(PS) is in
the second tercile, and “Large” if lagged log(PS) is in the largest tercile. For firm-level
analysis, I identify firms within the product group by Scantrack market by year cells. The
dependent variables are product scope in logs (columns (1) and (3)) and product scope
growth (column (2)). The main regressor is the regional unemployment rate.
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Table 1.6: Cyclicality of Firm Sales: Firm-level Analysis
(1) (2) (3)









Product group fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Region fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Firm size fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.9044 0.1882 0.9044
Observations 4700177 4700177 4700177
Notes: ∗p < 0.1, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01. Standard errors are clustered at the Scantrack
market level. Growth rates are in percentages. A firm is “Small” if its lagged log(PS) is in
the first tercile or the firm is a new entrants, “Medium” if lagged log(PS) is in the second
tercile, and “Large” if lagged log(PS) is in the largest tercile. For firm-level analysis, I
identify firms within the product group by Scantrack market by year cells. The dependent
variables are firm sales in logs (columns (1) and (3)) and firm sales growth (column (2)).
The main regressor is the regional unemployment rate.
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Table 1.7: Cyclicality of Firms’ Product Scope: National vs. Regional Firms
(1) (2)
log(PS)m,grt log(PS)m,grt
Small× URrt 0.0019 0.0003
(0.0021) (0.0024)
Medium× URrt -0.0041* -0.0038*
(0.0022) (0.0022)
Large× URrt 0.0003 0.0006
(0.0025) (0.0026)
Small× Local× URrt 0.0195***
(0.0053)
Medium× Local× URrt -0.0113**
(0.0051)
Large× Local× URrt -0.1201***
(0.0241)
Product group fixed effects Yes Yes
Region fixed effects Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes
Firm size fixed effects Yes Yes
Local-firm fixed effects Yes Yes
R2 0.9160 0.9162
Observations 1543563 1543563
Notes: ∗p < 0.1, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01. Standard errors are clustered at the Scantrack
market level. Growth rates are in percentages. A firm is “Small” if its lagged log(PS)
is in the first tercile or the firm is a new entrants, “Medium” if lagged log(PS) is in the
second tercile, and “Large” if lagged log(PS) is in the largest tercile. A firm is local if it
sells in only one market and national if it sells in all 49 markets. For firm-level analysis, I
identify firms within the product group by Scantrack market by year cells. The dependent
variable is product scope in logs. The main regressor is the regional unemployment rate.
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Table 1.8: Cyclicality of Average Product Scope: Cell-based Approach, Continuing
firms
(1) (2)





Product group fixed effects Yes Yes
Region fixed effects Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes
R2 0.4495 0.4496
Observations 39,445 39,445
Notes: ∗p < 0.1, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01. Standard errors are clustered at the Scantrack
market level. In the cell-based approach, a cell is a product group by Scantrack market by
year observation. I use the average measurement across continuing firms as the cell-level
measurement. The dependent variable is the growth of average product scope. The main
independent variable in column (1) is the regional unemployment rate, and the alternative
in column (2) is its change.
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Table 1.9: Cyclicality of Firms’ Product Scope: Firm-level Analysis, Continuing
firms
(1) (2) (3)









Product group fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Region fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Firm size fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.8428 0.0500 0.8428
Observations 4035742 4035742 4035742
Notes: ∗p < 0.1, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01. Standard errors are clustered at the Scantrack
market level. Growth rates are in percentages. A firm is “Small” if its lagged log(PS) is in
the first tercile, “Medium” if lagged log(PS) is in the second tercile, and “Large” if lagged
log(PS) is in the largest tercile. For firm-level analysis, I identify firms within the product
group by Scantrack market by year cells. The dependent variables are product scope in
logs (columns (1) and (3)) and product scope growth (column (2)). The main regressor is
the regional unemployment rate.
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Table 1.10: Cyclicality of Firm Sales: Firm-level Analysis, Continuing firms
(1) (2) (3)









Product group fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Region fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Firm size fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.9114 0.0560 0.9114
Observations 4035742 4035742 4035742
Notes: ∗p < 0.1, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01. Standard errors are clustered at the Scantrack
market level. Growth rates are in percentages. A firm is “Small” if its lagged log(PS)
is in the first tercile, “Medium” if lagged log(PS) is in the second tercile, and “Large” if
lagged log(PS) is in the largest tercile. For firm-level analysis, I identify firms within the
product group by Scantrack market by year cells. The dependent variables are firm sales
in logs (columns (1) and (3)) and firm sales growth (column (2)). The main regressor is
the regional unemployment rate.
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Table 1.11: Cyclicality of Firms’ Product Scope: Alternative Firm Size Measure
(1) (2) (3)









Product group fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Region fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Firm-size fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.7304 0.2634 0.7304
Observations 4700177 4700177 4700177
Notes: ∗p < 0.1, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01. Standard errors are clustered at the Scantrack
market level. Growth rates are in percentages. A firm is “Small” if its lagged log(sales)
are in the first tercile or the firm is a new entrants, “Medium” if lagged log(sales) are in
the second tercile, and “Large” if lagged log(sales) are in the largest tercile. For firm-level
analysis, I identify firms within the product group by Scantrack market by year cells. The
dependent variables are product scope in logs (columns (1) and (3)) and product scope
growth (column (2)). The main regressor is the regional unemployment rate.
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Table 1.12: Cyclicality of Firm Sales: Alternative Firm Size Measure
(1) (2) (3)









Product group fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Region fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Firm size fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.9405 0.1531 0.9405
Observations 4700177 4700177 4700177
Notes: ∗p < 0.1, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01. Standard errors are clustered at the Scantrack
market level. Growth rates are in percentages. A firm is “Small” if its lagged log(sales)
are in the first tercile or the firm is a new entrants, “Medium” if lagged log(sales) are in
the second tercile, and “Large” if lagged log(sales) are in the largest tercile. For firm-level
analysis, I identify firms within the product group by Scantrack market by year cells. The
dependent variables are firm sales in logs (columns (1) and (3)) and firm sales growth
(column (2)). The main regressor is the regional unemployment rate.
Table 1.13: Parameter Values
Parameter Value Source
Frisch elasticity of labor supply ξ 2 From King and Rebelo (1999)
Elasticity of substitution η 3.9 From Hottman et al. (2015)
Lower bound of φ̃m λ 1 Normalization
Parameter Value Data Model
Annual discount factor β 0.96 4% 4%
Preference parameter for labor χ 8 0.25 0.25
Shape parameter of φ̃m dist. γ 160 13 14
Upper bound of φ̃m λ̄ 1.6 130 117
Fixed cost per product fV 0.00015 3 3
Entry cost fE 0.000057 0.5 0.39
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Figure 1.3: Model Fit: Distribution of Firm Product Scope
Notes: The data plot (left) pools over firms of different product groups, Scantrack markets
and years. The product scope levels on x-axes are adjusted by dividing by average product
scope. In the data, the average is calculated at the level of product group by region by
year.
Table 1.14: Differences in Key Outcomes: Recession versus Normal State
Full model Fixed PS
(1) (2) (3)
Consumption (output) growth -3.50 -3.53 -2.55
Price index growth 3.75 3.77 2.73
Labor growth -0.51 -0.50 -0.36
Continuing firms: Average PS growth -0.62 - -
Net firm entry rate 0 -17.39 -12.57
Average markup change 0.014 0.012 0.009
Notes: Two models are considered: the full model with endogenous product scope (PS)
and an otherwise identical model with fixed product scope. For each model, I compare two
steady states. The normal steady state is obtained with the parameter values provided
in Table 1.13. The recession steady state has lower average productivity level and higher
productivity dispersion and is obtained by decreasing the range of firm level productivity
such that productivity∈ [1−d, 1.6−d]. The cases (1) and (2), the same shock is considered:




Appendix A. More empirical findings
A1. Firm dynamics and product scope adjustment: correlations with
aggregates
To compare the within-firm product scope adjustment margin with the firm
entry and exit margin, I also run the following regression using total sales R:
∆ln(N̄m)grt = αg + φr + µt + β∆ln(R)grt + εgrt, (1.19)
where N̄m is the average product scope of each firm, g represents product group, r
denotes Scantrack market, and t is year.
The estimated coefficient is 0.11, the correlation between the log growth rates
of total sales and firms’ product scope. By replacing the left-hand side with the log
growth in number of firms in the regression equation, the estimated coefficient, 0.13,
is the correlation between the log growth rates of total sales and firm number. By
employing a simple accounting identity R = MN̄mR̄mi, where R̄mi is the average
sales per product, I know that the correlation between the log growth rates of total
sales and the average firm sales per product is 0.77(=1-0.11-0.13).
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A2. Cyclicality of firm sales share
Table 1.5 shows that small firms’ sales are moderately procyclical, medium
firms’ sales are mostly procyclical, and large firms’ sales respond the least. The
nonlinear changes in firm sales implies that the ratio of firm sales over the total
sales respond to the local unemployment rate differentially by firm size. Table 1.15
column (3) demonstrates that the large firms are most recession-proof and acquire
more market share in recessions than in normal times, while columns (1) and (2)
confirm that the firms surviving the recession on average have higher market shares
than in normal times.
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Table 1.15: Cyclicality of Firm Sales Share: Firm-level Analysis
(1) (2) (3)









Product group fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Region fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Firm size fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.1815 0.0009 0.1816
Observations 4700177 4700177 4700177
Notes: ∗p < 0.1, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01. Standard errors are clustered at the Scantrack
market level. Growth rates are in percentages. A firm is “Small” if its lagged log(PS) is in
the first tercile or the firm is a new entrants, “Medium” if lagged log(PS) is in the second
tercile, and “Large” if lagged log(PS) is in the largest tercile. For firm-level analysis, I
identify firms within the product group by Scantrack market by year cells. The dependent
variables are firm sales share in percentage (columns (1) and (3)) and changes in firm sales
share (column (2)). The firm sales share is the ratio of firm sales over the total sales. The
main regressor is the regional unemployment rate.
A3. More robustness checks
A3.i Firm-specific business cycle indicators
The firm-level data can be used to construct a Bartik-type firm-specific busi-
ness cycle indicator, the sales growth of rival firms. This firm-specific business cycle
indicator can replace regional unemployment rate in firm-level regression:
ym,grt = αg + ψr + ωt + βSalesGrowth
∼m
grt + εmgrt, (1.20)
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where m denotes the firm, g the product group, r the Scantrack market, and t the
year. SalesGrowth∼mgrt is the business cycle indicator specific to firm m: the growth
rate of product group g’s sales in Scantrack market r and year t excluding firm
m. In other words, SalesGrowth∼mgrt represents how well the firm’s rivals do in the
economy.
Table 1.16 summarizes the regression results. Both the log of firms’ product
scope and the product scope growth rates are positively correlated with the firm-
specific business cycle indicator. This again suggests that firms product group is
procyclical on average.






Product group fixed effect Yes Yes
Scantrack market fixed effect Yes Yes
Year fixed effect Yes Yes
R2 0.0447 0.0123
Observations 4700009 4700009
Note: ∗p < 0.1, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01. Standard errors are clustered at the Scantrack
market level. The dependent variables are product scope in logs (column (1)) and product
scope growth (column (2)). SalesGrowth∼mgrt is the business cycle indicator specific to the
firm: the growth rate of the firm’s rivals within the product group by Scantrack market
by year cell. Growth rates are in percentages.
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A3.ii Additional firm control: Firm age
Firm age can be inferred in the Nielsen data. I keep the later periods in the
sample (2011–2014) and define a firm as “Old” if it is more than five years old and
“Young” if not. Table 1.17 reports the regression results with the additional firm
control, showing that the empirical pattern that firms’ product scope is procyclical
on average remains true.
Table 1.17: Cyclicality of Firms’ Product Scope: Additional Firm Control
(1) (2) (3) (4)
log(PS)m,grt log(PS)m,grt PS growthm,grt PS growthm,grt
URrt -0.0071*** -0.0073*** -0.8140*** -0.7392***
(0.0020) (0.0020) (0.2215) (0.2299)
Product group fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm size fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm age fixed effects - Yes - Yes
R2 0.8218 0.8220 0.4334 0.4498
Observations 2712215 2712215 2712215 2712215
Note: ∗p < 0.1, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01. Standard errors are clustered at the Scantrack
market level. Only firms in 2011–2014 are considered. The dependent variables are product
scope in logs (columns (1) and (2)) and product scope growth (columns (3) and (4)). Firm
age is the last year minus the first year that the firm operates and plus one. Growth rates
are in percentages.
A3.iii Changes in firm distribution
I next compute the skewness of firms’ product scope distribution, using robust
measures of skewness, which equal (90%tile + 10%tile + 2 ∗ median)/(90%tile −














where Nm,grt is the product scope of firm m (total firm number M) in product group
g, Scantrack market r, and year t, and N̄grt is the across-firm average.
I run the regression in equation (2.4) for these measures and their changes. Ta-
ble 1.18 summarizes the results.31 A positive coefficient implies that the advantage
of large firms relative to small firms becomes more pronounced in times of recession.
The estimated coefficient in front of regional unemployment are always positive and
sometimes also significant.
Table 1.18: Changes in Firms’ Product Scope Distribution
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Skewnessgrt ∆(Skewness)grt Theilgrt ∆(Theil)grt
URrt 0.0009 0.0014** 0.0011* 0.0003
(0.0009) (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0004)
Product group fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Scantrack market fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 44,746 39,130 45,080 39,445
R-squared 0.4056 0.0154 0.9293 0.0941
Note: Note: ∗p < 0.1, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01. Standard errors are clustered at the
Scantrack market level. Skewness equals (90%tile + 10%tile + 2 ∗ median)/(90%tile −
10%tile). Theil index formula is given in (1.21).
31Similar weak results are obtained by using other skewness measures (e.g., 90%tile/50%tile,
50%tile/10%tile) and concentration measures (e.g., the Herfindahl index).
56
Appendix B. Data details
B1. Data cleaning
1. Data in 2006: The Nielsen Scanner data is available from 2006. However, the
sales related to the state of Winsconsin experience 175% increase from 2006
to 2007. I only keep the data starting from 2007.
2. Private labels: The UPCs of private labels goods are altered by Nielsen by
mapping several different UPCs to a single ”masked” UPC. There is no way
to accurately link these UPCs to their manufacturers. Therefore, I drop the
private label UPCs.
3. UPC version: In addition to UPC codes, Nielsen assigns a version number
to each unique UPC. The idea is that the key attributes of a given UPC can
change over time. For example, the size attibute of a UPC changes temporarily
to reflect special promotion and then reverts to its original value. More gener-
ally speaking, there are three cases associates with UPC version changes: (a)
a few characteristics of a product may have changed, such as the size changes;
(b) the same UPC code can refer to completely different products; or (c) the
product has been assigned to a different product module by Nielsen, and none
of the main characteristics of the product have changed.
For case (a), treating the same UPC codes of the different versions as different
products will over-identify products. Case (b) is the result of recycling UPC
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codes within and across firms. The former will interupt a firm’s inventory sys-
tem and the latter is said to be rare according to GS1. Therefore, I neglect this
possibility. Case (c) is due to arbitrary changes of product module definition.
I detect and drop the UPCs of which their product module changes.
After the clearning, I treat the UPCs of different versions as the same product
and link the UPCs to their manufacturers using GS1 data. This is consistent
with the GS1 data system for that it also identifies a product by UPC codes
only.
4. Prices: In the Nielsen weekly datasets, the reported prices are the volume
weighted averages for the associated UPCs with certain packing size and mea-
surement units specified. Although not perfectl reflecting all the discounts and
taxes faced by the cousumers, the prices are good approxies of the final prices
in the eyes of the consumers. When I use price information, I further convert
the prices to unit prices: e.g. the price of 1-oz carbonated beverage.
58
B2. Data summary
Table 1.19: List of the Nielsen product groups
AUTOMOTIVE BABY FOOD
BABY NEEDS BAKED GOODS-FROZEN
BAKING MIXES BAKING SUPPLIES
BATTERIES AND FLASHLIGHTS BEER
BOOKS AND MAGAZINES BREAD AND BAKED GOODS
BREAKFAST FOOD BREAKFAST FOODS-FROZEN
BUTTER AND MARGARINE CANDY
CANNING, FREEZING SUPPLIES CARBONATED BEVERAGES
CEREAL CHARCOAL, LOGS, ACCESSORIES
CHEESE COFFEE
CONDIMENTS, GRAVIES, AND SAUCES COOKIES
COOKWARE COSMETICS
COT CHEESE, SOUR CREAM, TOPPINGS COUGH AND COLD REMEDIES
CRACKERS DEODORANT
DESSERTS, GELATINS, SYRUP DESSERTS/FRUITS/TOPPINGS-FROZEN
DETERGENTS DIET AIDS
DISPOSABLE DIAPERS DOUGH PRODUCTS
DRESSINGS/SALADS/PREP FOODS-DELI EGGS
ELECTRONICS, RECORDS, TAPES ETHNIC HABA
FEMININE HYGIENE FIRST AID
FLORAL, GARDENING FLOUR
FRAGRANCES - WOMEN FRESH MEAT
FRESH PRODUCE FRESHENERS AND DEODORIZERS
FRUIT - CANNED FRUIT - DRIED
GLASSWARE, TABLEWARE GROOMING AIDS
GRT CARDS/PARTY NEEDS/NOVELTIES GUM
HAIR CARE HARDWARE, TOOLS
HOUSEHOLD CLEANERS HOUSEHOLD SUPPLIES
HOUSEWARES, APPLIANCES ICE
ICE CREAM, NOVELTIES INSECTICDS/PESTICDS/RODENTICDS
JAMS, JELLIES, SPREADS JUICE, DRINKS - CANNED, BOTTLED
JUICES, DRINKS-FROZEN KITCHEN GADGETS




PACKAGED MEATS-DELI PACKAGED MILK AND MODIFIERS
PAPER PRODUCTS PASTA
PERSONAL SOAP AND BATH ADDITIVES PET CARE
PET FOOD PHOTOGRAPHIC SUPPLIES
PICKLES, OLIVES, AND RELISH PIZZA/SNACKS/HORS DOEURVES-FRZN
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PREPARED FOOD-DRY MIXES PREPARED FOOD-READY-TO-SERVE
PREPARED FOODS-FROZEN PUDDING, DESSERTS-DAIRY
SALAD DRESSINGS, MAYO, TOPPINGS SANITARY PROTECTION
SEAFOOD - CANNED SEASONAL
SEWING NOTIONS SHAVING NEEDS
SHOE CARE SHORTENING, OIL
SKIN CARE PREPARATIONS SNACKS
SNACKS, SPREADS, DIPS-DAIRY SOFT DRINKS-NON-CARBONATED
SOUP SPICES, SEASONING, EXTRACTS
STATIONERY, SCHOOL SUPPLIES SUGAR, SWEETENERS
TABLE SYRUPS, MOLASSES TEA
TOBACCO & ACCESSORIES TOYS & SPORTING GOODS
UNPREP MEAT/POULTRY/SEAFOOD-FRZN VEGETABLES - CANNED
VEGETABLES AND GRAINS - DRIED VEGETABLES-FROZEN
VITAMINS WINE
WRAPPING MATERIALS AND BAGS YEAST
YOGURT
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Chapter 2: Product Switching within Multiproduct Firms
2.1 Introduction
The existing literature on firm and product dynamics has been mainly focused
on firm entry and exit and the associated reallocation across firms. But as recent
empirical studies point out, within-firm product adjustments are more important
than across-firm adjustments (Broda and Weinstein (2010), Bernard et al. (2010)
and Garcia-Macia et al. (2016)). In this chapter, I investigate within-firm prod-
uct dynamics in detail. The measures of such dynamics include entry, exit, net
entry and reallocation across products. I focus the latter two measures using the
Nielsen consumer product sales data for 2007–2014 along with manufacturer annual
fundamental information from Compustat for listed firms.1
I first show, with the data for all the Nielsen firms, that firms’ net product
entry and product reallocation are low in recession years. Regressions of the net
1All empirical results are calculated based on data from The Nielsen Company (US), LLC and
marketing databases provided by the Kilts Center for Marketing Data Center at The University of
Chicago Booth School of Business. Data copyright c© 2018 The Nielsen Company (US), LLC. All
Rights Reserved. The conclusions drawn from the Nielsen data are those of the researchers and do
not reflect the views of Nielsen. Nielsen is not responsible for, had no role in, and was not involved
in analyzing and preparing the results reported herein. In addition to the Nielsen data, Wharton
Research Data Services (WRDS) was used in preparing the empirical results. This service and the
data available thereon constitute valuable intellectual property and trade secrets of WRDS and/or
its third-party suppliers.
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entry and reallocation rates on a business cycle indicator, the unemployment rate,
reveals that net entry and reallocation are procyclical on average. Moreover, firms
of different size have different sensitivities to aggregate conditions. Among small,
medium-sized and large firms, net product entry and product reallocation are the
most procyclical for small firms. The impacts of a recession on large firms’ net
product entry and reallocation tend to be small.
The listed Nielsen firms correspond to the largest firms in the Nielsen data.2
Using the Nielsen-Compustat merged data, I establish empirical patterns of the net
product entry and product reallocation within firms and their relationship with the
aggregate economic conditions and firm fundamentals.
The listed Nielsen firms’ product net entry rates decrease as aggregate eco-
nomic conditions worsen. This is consistent with Axarloglou (2003), which is among
the first studies showing the business cycle properties of product introductions at
the firm level. The author collects anecdotal evidence of product introductions from
newspapers and finds that product introductions are procyclical and rise when ag-
gregate or market demands increase. Controlling for aggregate economic conditions,
firm-level factors don’t affect the net entry rates.
Product reallocation of the listed Nielsen firms is low in the Great Recession.
But the correlation between reallocation and the unemployment rate, the business
cycle indicator, is only weakly negative. When controlling for firm fundamentals,
the impact of the business cycle indicator on reallocation further declines. Firm
2The sizes of the listed Nielsen firms and the large Nielsen firms in terms of product scope are
comparable. Note that the boundaries of firms change from the Nielsen data to the Compustat
data. See section 3 for details.
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R&D expenses and financial constraints are the main factors that affect reallocation.
The higher the R&D, or the the looser the financial constraints, the higher the
reallocation. My observation of weak cyclicality of product reallocation within firms
is not in conflict with Argente et al. (2018). The authors’ claim of the procyclicality
of the reallocation refers to the lower average reallocation rates in recession years.
In the firm-level regression, the main contribution factor for reallocation is R&D
expense.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In section 2.2, I review the
related literature. In section 2.3, I describe the data and main product switching
measures. Section 2.4 reports the empirical results for all the continuing Nielsen
firms. In section 2.5, I run the regressions for the listed Nielsen firms only, while
controlling for firm fundamental factors. Section 2.6 summarizes.
2.2 Literature Review
The first relevant literature studies the importance of within-firm product
adjustments. Broda and Weinstein (2010) investigate ACNielsen Homescan data
that record consumer goods purchases in the U.S. for 1994 and 1999–2003. Most
product switching occurs within firms, and product additions and subtractions are
common within firms. Bernard et al. (2010) use longitudinal data covering 1987-
1997 from the US Census Bureau and find that an average of 54 percent of the
surviving firms in their sample alter their mix of products over a period of five
years. Garcia-Macia et al. (2016) also contribute to the discussion and show that
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most firm employment growth occurs through firms’ own-product improvements.
The discovery of the importance of within-firm adjustments and the recent
availability of large-scale micro-level data has stirred researchers’ interest in the in-
vestigation of the cyclicality of firm-level product switching. The growing literature
mostly focuses on product reallocation. For example, Bernard and Okubo (2016)
use annual firm-product data set covering all Japanese manufacturing firms in 1992–
2006 and show that firms’ reallocation rates are the highest during transitions from
recessions to expansions. Argente et al. (2018) show that product reallocation within
firms is low in recession years. Moreover, when considering firm fundamentals, R&D
is the most important factor affecting product reallocation. Argente et al. (2018)
is also an example of making use of the new micro-level data, being the first to
combine the Nielsen data with the Compustat data.
Compared to Argente et al. (2018), my main improvements are (i) distin-
guishing firms belonging to product groups, (ii) using regressions with a business
cycle indicator in the cyclicality investigation and (iii) discussing net entry and re-
allocation at the same time. Controlling for differences across product groups is
particularly important because the product groups in the Nielsen data might differ
greatly in nature. For instance, the three product groups of photographic supplies,
housewares and appliances, and electronics have high reallocation rates across prod-
ucts within the product group, as found by Hottman et al. (2016). In addition to
these improvements, I also refine the name matching method between the Nielsen
and Compustat firms. On the one hand, some Nielsen firms are small local producers
and their names could sometimes be confused with the names of large listed firms
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if only looking at the key words in the company names. On the other hand, some
Nielsen firms can be subsidiaries or divisions of a listed firm and their matching
with the parent firm can be easily neglected if we apply a strict rule. The solution
is to combine the two ways of matching. When matching the whole names, I keep
as much information as possible, not dropping generic terms. A second-round of
key-word matching will then pick up overlooked subsidiaries and divisions.
Another strand of relevant literature considers the firm fundamentals that
play a role in product switching. These firm factors affect product switching, espe-
cially product reallocation, through innovations, which increase product reallocation
(Grossman and Helpman (1991) and Aghion and Howitt (1992)). R&D is one mea-
sure of firms’ innovations, and financial conditions can also affect innovation. Em-
pirical studies on the impact of financial conditions show that financial constraints
hurt innovation. For example, Savignac (2008), using a direct measure of financial
constraints from a survey addressed to French established firms, finds that financial
constraints significantly reduce the likelihood that firms have innovative activities.
More broadly, the paper is also related to the literature on endogenous growth,
in which innovations translate into growth through firm and product dynamics tak-
ing the forms of: (i) improving on existing products of other firms, i.e, creative de-
struction (Schumpeter et al. (1939), Stokey (1988), Grossman and Helpman (1991),
Aghion and Howitt (1992), Klette and Kortum (2004), Lentz and Mortensen (2008),
Acemoglu et al. (2013)), (ii) improving firms’ own products (Lucas Jr and Moll
(2014)), and (iii) introducing brand new products (Romer (1990), Acemoglu (2003)
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and Jones (2016)).3 My paper emphasizes the latter two types of reallocation. The
within-firm product improvement, measured by the within-firm product realloca-
tion, is the most important among the three forms in my data. The introduction of
brand new products is measured by the net entry of products and moves cyclically.
This paper tests the implications of these endogenous growth theories, by testing for
a the positive correlation between R&D and reallocation and between reallocation
and growth. In addition, the paper also provides new stylized facts and moments
for modeling and calibration.
2.3 Data
2.3.1 The Nielsen Retail Scanner
The Nielsen Scanner dataset contains consumer goods purchases reported by
retail stores in all US markets. The data contains the geographic locations of the
retail stores, the transaction dates, and the Universal Product Codes (UPCs) of the
products that were bought. The UPC codes define products. My Retail Scanner
sample covers years 2007–2014. The data have approximately 35,000 participating
grocery, drug, mass merchandiser, and other stores. To isolate from the impacts
of store entry and exit, I focus on a balanced panel of stores. The balanced panel
contains 28,953 stores, which account for about 90% of the total transactions.
I keep products that use standard UPCs and drop the so-called magnet prod-
ucts which use non-standard UPCs, such as weighted meat, fruits and vegetables.
3Aghion et al. (2014) drive home an extensive survey of the literature.
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In addition, I drop private labels, products directly owned by retail stores, of which
the UPCs are masked. UPCs are assigned to a product group. Furthermore, sales
are grouped into different regions, specifically Scantrack markets. In the baseline
Nielsen analysis, controlling for product group fixed effects takes care of the indus-
try composition changes in the data, and distinguishing regions allows me to use
regional variation in the business cycle indicator. In the baseline Nielsen sample,
which is balanced in terms of product group and regions, there are 115 product
groups for 49 Scantrack markets, and 1.3 million unique UPCs.
The Nielsen data don’t directly identify manufacturers of UPCs. I use data
matching UPCs and their corresponding company prefix number from GS1 US, the
standards institution for UPCs. 96% of the Scanner UPCs are matched with their
manufacturers.
In the following empirical analysis, the Nielsen firm by product group by region
by year data is used as the starting point and benchmark. Moreover, I supplement
the Nielsen sales data with data on firm fundamentals from Compustat.
2.3.2 Compustat
The Compustat annual data provides an in-depth description of listed firms
that participate in the consumer goods market. Variables relating to firm funda-
mentals include but are not limited to firm size, productivity, financial constraint
conditions and Research and Development expenses. See Appendix B for the dis-
cussion of variable construction.
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To match the Nielsen firms with the Compustat data, I adopt a matching pro-
tocol based on Schoenle (2017). In essence, the matches are made by firm names.
Following Schoenle (2017), I remove the cases of the letters in the firm names and
omit punctuation marks.4 The cleaned firm names are further simplified by stan-
dardizing generic terms. Table 2.23 in the Appendix summarizes the steps. After
standardization and dropping the spaces in the firm name texts, perfect matches
are detected and saved.
A fuzzy matching algorithm is applied to the non-matched Nielsen firms and
the Compustat firms.5 Some of the non-matched Nielsen firms are small local pro-
ducers. Some have almost the same names as large publicly listed firms except for
standardized terms such as “Inc”. As a precaution when handling these small local
firms, standardized terms, already minimized in the text length as shown in the
Appendix table, are kept during the fuzzy matching. This is in contrast to Schoenle
(2017). The firm pairs identified in the fuzzy matching with high scores are then
manually checked based on their company information to insure that they are true
matches- the same firm or a division/subsidiary-parent pair.6
Another improvement in matching is specifically linking listed firms and their
divisions or subsidiaries. Some Nielsen firms are explicitly labeled as a firm’s busi-
ness or geographic divisions. Some other Nielsen firms are subsidiaries of a listed
firm and share the same key words, e.g. Unilever, with their parent firms. These
4The punctuation marks include “.”, “,”, “;”, “/”, “-”, “(”, “)”, “””, “[”, “]”, “{”, “}”, “&”,
“+”, “’ ”, “””, “:”, “!”.
5I use the Stata command reclink.
6One useful resource for the checking is the listed firms’ Exhibit 21 filings to the U.S. Secu-
rities and Exchange Commission. The filings contain the list of their subsidiaries. In addition,
Bloomberg.com provides private firm information and links a firm to its parent firm if applicable.
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division/subsidiary-parent pairs usually have low matching scores, because of the
differences in the length of the firm names, and are easily neglected. To deal with
such cases, another round of fuzzy matching is run based on low-frequency words
in firm names: Compustat firms whose names contain low-frequency words are kept
and matched against non-matched Nielsen firms. The matched pairs are also man-
ually checked.
In the Nielsen sample of the 115 product groups in 49 U.S. Scantrack markets,
there are 36,605 firms or firm divisions and subsidiaries, 449 of which have Com-
pustat counterparts, either the firms themselves or their parent firm. The number
of the listed Nielsen firms is 309 and they account for 34% of the total sales in the
Nielsen data. For the analysis of the listed Nielsen firms, divisions and subsidiaries
of the same firm are combined.
Notably, 40% of the publicly listed Nielsen firms operate in all 49 U.S. Scant-
rack markets, while the fraction of these firms selling products in 1-3 product groups
is more than 50%.7 In other words, a typical listed Nielsen firm has a national sales
network and concentrates its business in few product groups. At the same time, the
firm controls from Compustat are not specific to regions and the only regional con-
trol is the unemployment rate. Therefore, variation in a firm’s performance across
regions within product groups can only be accounted for by the business cycle in-
dicator. However, across-region variations are small for these listed Nielsen firms.8
Therefore, in the baseline listed Nielsen firm data, I define firms only by product
7For all the Nielsen firms, only 10% of the firms sell in all 49 regions, and about 70% of them
sell products in 1 product group.
8The standard deviations of the entry and exit rates are about 1/10 of the means, across regions
within firms and product groups.
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groups instead of by product group and region cells, while defining firms by product
group and region cells in the analysis of all the Nielsen firms to be consistent with
Chapter 1.
2.3.3 Product Switching Measures
To study the intensity of product switching in the data, I use the definition
of entry and exit rates in equation (2.1). For year t, an “entering” product (firm)
is a product (firm) not observed in the year t − 1 but observed in t, an “entering”
product (firm) is a product (firm) not observed in the year t but observed in t− 1.
Continuing products are those observed in both periods. For a firm m in product
group g and region r, its entry rate at year t is defined as the number of new products
(NNew) entering in the current period divided by the average of the total number
of products (NAll) in the current and base periods. Meanwhile, the exit rate is the
number of exiting products (NExit) from the last period over the two-period average
of the total number of products. The entry and exit rates are both bounded by [0,2]
and can account for entering and exiting firms. When a firm is new, its entry rate
is 2 (exit rate 0). When a firm exits from the market, its exit rate is 2 (entry rate













In addition to the gross entry and exit rates, two other statistics describing
entry and exit behaviors at firm level can be defined as in equation (2.2). The net
entry rate equals the gross entry rate minus the gross exit rate, while the reallocation
rate is the sum of the two.
NetEntrym,grt = Entrym,grt − Exitm,grt
Reallocationm,grt = Entrym,grt + Exitm,grt
(2.2)
These four product switching measures are computed using the numbers of
new, exiting or all the existing products. Another set of similar statistics can be built
based on firms’ product sales by types. The definitions are given in the equation
below. Instead of counting the number of new or exiting products, the addition
(subtraction) rates are the ratios of the sales of new (exiting) products over the
average total sales over the two subsequent periods. The net addition rate equals
the addition rate minus the subtraction rate, and the sales reallocation rate is the












NetAdditionm,grt = Additionm,grt − Subtractionm,grt
SalesReallocationm,grt = Additionm,grt + Subtractionm,grt
(2.3)
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Summary statistics for all the Nielsen firms’ product switching rates are given
in Table 2.1. The rates are expressed in percentage points. For continuing firms,
the average annual net product entry rate across all product groups and regions is
-2.14% over the years of 2007–2014 and -3.72% in the recession years 2008–2009.
The average annual reallocation rate also decreases slightly in the recession, being
34.98% annually for 2007–2014 and 34.64% for 2008–2009.
The same sets of product dynamics measures can be defined at the firm by
product group by year level for the listed Nielsen firms. Summary statistics are
shown in Table 2.2. The continuing listed firms’ net entry and reallocation rates
also decreases in the recession: -3.27% for all the years vs -4.26% for 2008-2009, and
33.06% for all the years vs 32.02 % respectively.
2.4 Empirical Results: All the Nielsen firms
2.4.1 Product Switching Rates
As in the firm-level regressions in Chapter 1, I regress firms’ product switching
measures on a business cycle indicator to reveal the cyclicality of the firms’ choices.
For the firm by product group by region by year Nielsen sample, the business cycle
indicator is the regional unemployment rate. A positive (negative) correlation with
the business cycle indicator means (countercyclicality) procyclicality. The regression
also controls for product group, region and year fixed effects. The regression also
includes a firm size indicator, as a simple dummy variable and interacted with
regional unemployment. A firm is “Small” if it is a new firm (observed in the
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current period but not in the previous one) or its lagged product scope in logs is in
the first tercile, “Medium” if its product scope in logs is in the second tercile, and
“Large” if its product scope in logs is in the largest tercile. The interaction allows the
correlation between the product switching statistics and the regional unemployment
rate to vary among firms of different sizes.
The regression results for the entry, exit, net entry and reallocation rates of all
the Nielsen firms are reported in Table 2.3. When I do not distinguish the differen-
tiated responses among firms of different sizes, the entry, net entry and reallocation
rates are marginally procyclical, and the exit rates are acyclical (Columns (1), (3),
(5) and (7)). The procyclicality of net entry is comparable to the procyclicality of
the net product scope growth reported in Chapter 1.9
Columns (2), (4), (6) and (8) show that the cyclicality of firms’ product switch-
ing varies by firm size. Small firms’ net entry is close to being procyclical and has
the largest coefficient among the small, medium-sized and large firms. If we fur-
ther look at entry and exit rates separately, small firms’ entry rates are the most
sensitive to the business cycle. This strong procyclicality is due to the lower prob-
ability for small firms to enter the market during recessions, and to small firms’
lower within-firm product entry rates. Small firms’ exit rates also decrease with the
unemployment rate. As a result, their net rates are weakly procyclical and their
reallocation rates are strongly procyclical. As opposed to small firms, large firms’
entry rates are acyclical and their exit rates are strongly procyclical. Their net entry
rates are procyclical, and their reallocation rates are acyclical. For medium-sized
9See Table 1.5 of Chapter 1 for cross-check.
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firms, the regional unemployment rate has only a weak impact on their product
switching rates.
One concern with the entry and exit measures defined using UPCs is that a
small change in characteristics might be considered as a different product. In other
words, the rates of product switching might be overestimated. As a complementary
exercise, let us look at the incidence of switching and define a dummy variable such
that Dummy(Add) = 1 if a firm adds one or more products from the last to the
current period and 0 otherwise. Similarly, Dummy(Drop) = 1 if a firm drops one
or more products from the last to the current period and 0 otherwise. Running the
firm-level regression for these dummy variables will shed some light on the cyclicality
of the probability of adding or dropping products, on average or by different firms.
Table 2.4 reports the results. Not surprisingly, the larger the firm, the higher
the probability to add a product. The pattern holds true for the probability of
dropping a product. So the incidence of reallocation is higher for large firms. When
distinguishing firms’ heterogeneous responses to the business cycle, Columns (2) and
(4) suggest that the probabilities of adding or dropping a product are significantly
procyclical and decrease more in the recession for small firms than for medium-
sized and large firms.10 For medium-sized firms, the probability of adding a product
is procyclical and the probability of dropping a product is acyclical. Large firms’
probability of adding or dropping a product doesn’t move with the business cycle.
10Table 2.17 in Appendix reports the results when restricting the sample to the continuing firms.
Conditional on survival, the small firms’ probability of adding a product becomes less procyclical
than the medium-sized firms.
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2.5 Empirical Results: the listed Nielsen firms
2.5.1 Who Are the Listed Nielsen Firms?
In this section, I consider only the listed Nielsen firms whose fundamental data
are available from Compustat. Before moving to the firm by product group by year
data, I first construct the firm by region by product group by year data of the listed
Nielsen firms, to compare with the baseline Nielsen firms.
Figure 2.1 compares the average product scope (number of products) of the
listed Nielsen firms to the average product scope of all the Nielsen firms whose
product scope lies in the first (left panel) and second terciles (right panel). The
listed firms’ average product scope lines well with the largest Nielsen firms in terms
of product scope, i.e. the first tercile firms, and is usually bigger than the medium-
sized Nielsen firms in terms of product scope. This suggests that the listed Nielsen
firms correspond to the large firms in the baseline Nielsen data.11 The empirical
patterns of product entry and exit of the listed Nielsen firms are likely to resemble
the large firms in the previous section.
2.5.2 Product and Sales Shares by Firm Types
Using the firm by product group by year data of the listed Nielsen firms, I
first show that product switching is pervasive at the firm level. Table 2.5 shows
the shares of product and sales accounted for by different groups of firms. The
11Table 2.20 reports the regression results estimating the cyclicality of firms’ product scope.
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left side of the upper and lower panels uses the current period as the benchmark
and looks backward. There are three types of firms: continuing firms with product
switching, entering firms, and continuing firms without product switching. The right
side of the upper and lower panels uses the current period as the benchmark and
looks forward. I consider continuing firms with product switching, exiting firms,
and continuing firms without product switching. We can see that continuing firms
who add or drop products account for the majority of the products in the consumer
goods market.12 Their shares are higher in terms of sales, since continuing firms are
usually larger than entrants and exiters.
The upper panel of the table is for all the sample years while the lower panel
focuses on the recession years 2008-2009. In the recession years, if we look backward,
the sales share of the continuing firms who switch products drops from 92.5% to
91.9% and the sales share of the continuing firm who don’t adjust products goes up.
The same pattern holds when we look forward or use product shares. This suggests
that reallocation weakens in the recession.
2.5.3 Net Entry and Reallocation Rates
Two product switching measures of special interest are the net product entry
and reallocation rates. The former affects how many products are available in the
market, together with firm dynamics. The latter are important for growth, as
discussed intensively in the endogenous growth literature.
12The continuing firms with product switching can further be divided into the firms with only
product entry, with only product exit, and with both. The last type is the most common.
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I run the following regression for the net entry and reallocation rates:
ym,gt = cm + αg + βURt + controlsm,t−1 + εm,gt, (2.4)
where m stands for a listed Nielsen firm, g is product group and t is year. The
economy-wide regressor is the national unemployment rate. The firm level controls
include lagged total sales of the listed across all product types (Firm size), the
lagged Kaplan-Zingales index (Financial constraint, a measure proposed in Kaplan
and Zingales (1997)), and the lagged ratio of the research and development expense
out of the total sales in percentage points (R&D). The construction of the firm
controls are discussed in details in Appendix B. I also consider firm fixed effects and
product group fixed effects in the firm-level regressions.
Table 2.6 shows results for net entry.13 Firms’ net entry rates are significantly
procyclical. While controlling for the business cycle, the impacts of other firm-level
factors such as firm size, financial constraints and R&D are not significant. Table
2.7 shows results for reallocation. In contrast to the case of the net entry, the
impact of the business cycle is not significant. Two factors influencing reallocation
are firms’ R&D ratios and financial constraints. As R&D ratio increases or financial
constraint loosens, reallocation increases. When the R&D ratio increases by 1%,
product reallocation increases by 5%. When the financial constraint decreases by 1,
product reallocation increases by 0.02%.
13See Appendix A for the regression results of the underlying entry and exit rates.
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2.5.4 Robustness Checks
In this section, I conduct robustness checks of the firm level regressions for
the net entry and reallocation rates. First, I consider an alternative firm control:
firm’s productivity (TFP). Second, I run the regressions for the sales based product
addition and subtraction rates.
2.5.4.1 Alternative Firm Control
Instead of the lagged size of the listed firms, I use lagged productivity as
the main firm-level control. To some extent, the productivity level stands for the
potential size of the firm. The higher the productivity level, the higher the potential.
Table 2.8 reports results for net entry. As the unemployment rate increases, the net
entry rate decreases. The negative correlation is close to being significant. As above,
the impacts of firm controls on the net entry rate are not significant.
In Table 2.9, we see similar results for reallocation to when firm size is the main
control, except that the impact of firms’ productivity on reallocation is negative and
significant. This suggests that although technology might grow as the reallocation
rates rise, the converse is not true.
2.5.4.2 Sales-based Addition and Subtraction Rates
The baseline regressions can be repeated for measures of net entry and real-
location in terms of sales instead of product number counts. Table 2.10 shows the
result for the net product addition rate. Although the unemployment still has the
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negative coefficient, the coefficient is not significant. Recall that the net addition
rate equals the sales growth rate at the firm level. The regression results confirm
that large firms’ sales growth are insensitive to the business cycle changes, even
when controlling for these firm fundamentals. This is consistent with the model and
empirical results from Chapter 1. Table 2.11 shows results for the reallocation rates.
Firms’ financial condition and R&D significantly affect reallocation. The tighter the
financial conditions, or the lower the R&D expenses, the lower the sales-based real-
location rate. The results are consistent with those of the net entry and reallocation
rates measured in terms of product counts.
2.6 Discussion
2.6.1 Reconsider the Role of Multiproduct Firms in the Business
Cycle Setting
In Chapter 1, I investigate firms’ product scope, a specific aspect of multiprod-
uct firms’ product choices in a business cycle setting. I look at how firms’ product
scope levels change over the recent business cycle and see the aggregate implications
of such changes through the lens of a multiproduct firms model. One stylized fact
is that firms’ product scope is procyclical on average. Therefore, in the context of
the product entry and exit rates, I expect that the within-firm product net entry
rates are procyclical. This pattern is confirmed in the data for both all the Nielsen
firms and for the listed Nielsen firms.
With the Compustat firm-level data, I can test the implication of the model
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of Chapter 1 that firm-level markups are countercyclical. I cannot test for counter-
cyclical markups in the full Nielsen sample, due to the lack of manufacturers’ cost
information in the Nielsen datasets. Here I define the markup as the margin of price
over total cost and look at the cyclicality of this margin. The data points are firm
by year observations from Compustat for the listed Nielsen firms. The regression
equation for cyclical markups simplifies as follows
ym,t = cm + βURt + controlsm,t−1 + εm,t, (2.5)
Table 2.12 shows the regression results when ym,tismarkupgrowth.Thefirm−
levelcontrolinColumn(2)isthelaggedmarkup.Whentheunemploymentrateincreasesby1point,markupgrowthincreasesby1%, andthisresponseisstatisticallysignificant.Thecountercyclicalityoffirmmarkupsremainstruewhencontrollingforthelaggedmarkup.
In addition to the cyclicality of firms’ product entry, this chapter also discusses
other factors that can potentially affect firms’ product choices, such as R&D and
financial constraints. These firm controls don’t have significant impacts on net
product entry within firms, which is in favor of the product scope model of chapter
1. But that is not the end of the story– reallocation also matters.
2.6.2 Reallocation and Growth
Another important measure of product dynamics is reallocation, which is an
important channel through which innovations affect growth. This is extensively
discussed in the literature studying innovation, reallocation and growth. In this
chapter, I investigate within-firm product reallocation, and show its contribution
to short-run growth through its correlation with the future growth of firms’ sales
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per product. The growth of firms’ sales per product, as opposed to the growth of
firm-level total sales across products, is isolated from the direct impact of product
scope changes, which are cyclical and important in their own right. By a simple
accounting identity, the growth rate of sales per product equals the growth of firm
sales minus the growth of firm product scope.
I first show the correlation between a firm’s reallocation rate and its future
growth of sales per product using the full Nielsen sample. Table 2.13 reports the
result. The main regressors are lagged reallocation and the regional unemployment
rate. No matter whether the differentiated response to the business cycle is con-
sidered or not, lagged reallocation has a positive and significant impact on future
growth of sales. As reallocation rate increased by 1%, growth of sales per product
increases by 0.02%.
Column (2) of Table 2.14 shows the results from regressing the growth of firm
sales per product on the lagged reallocation rate for the listed Nielsen firms. Lagged
reallocation has a significant positive impact on sales growth. As reallocation rate
increased by 1%, growth of sales per product increases by 0.2%. The correlation
between a firm’s reallocation rate and its future growth of sales per product is higher
for the listed firms than for all the firms.Lagged R&D also has a significant large
positive impact on growth, when controlling for the last-period reallocation.
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2.6.3 Reallocation Types: Business Stealing or Own-product Im-
provement
From Table 2.5, we can see that continuing firms that add and/or drop prod-
ucts account for the majority of the sales, while neither entering or exiting firms
contribute much to sales. For continuing firms’ product switching, is there shuffling
across firms (business stealing) or does the reallocation happen mostly within the
boundaries of firms (own-product improvement)? To answer this, I regress firms’
product exit rates on their own last-period product entry rates and their rivals’
last-period average product entry rates weighted by the size of their product scope
sizes. The rivals of a firm are all the other firms in the same product group observed
in the same period.
Table 2.15 reports the result for all the Nielsen firms. I consider the regional
unemployment as the main other regressor. The lagged own entry rate has a pos-
itively significant impact on the own exit rate. The lagged entry rate of a firm’s
rivals, in contrast, has no significant impact on a its exit rate.
In Column (2) of Table 2.16, lagged own entry has a significant positive impact
on the own exit rate, while the lagged entry of rival firms does not. This suggests that
reallocation happens mostly within firms in the form of renewing and improving the
firms’ own products.14 In addition, increases in lagged R&D incentivize the firms’
to give up products, through the implied potential innovations not picked up by
14Distinguishing the types is important because their policy implications are distinct. Burstein




Firms in the Nielsen sample are heterogeneous in characteristics such as size,
and respond to the business cycle in different ways. Using the Nielsen-Compustat
merged data, I investigate extensively the within-firm product switching behavior
of the listed Nielsen firms. Although the listed firms do business in the same sets
of product groups as the unlisted firms, most of them have a sales network covering
the whole nation and have a large number of products in a given product group
and region. I interpret them as equivalent to the large firms in the Nielsen baseline
sample.
The main measures of interest are the within-firm net entry and reallocation
rates, both of which are low in the recession years. I make use of the rich firm-level
fundamental information in the Compustat data to reveal the factors governing the
changes in firms’ product dynamics. The potential influential factors include the
business cycle indicator, firm size, financial constraints, and R&D.
I use firm-level regressions to pin down the factors that influence these product
switching rates. Net product entry has a negative correlation with the unemploy-
ment rate, the business cycle indicator, while its correlation with firm-level fun-
damentals is not significant. Reallocation correlates with firm R&D expense and
financial constraints, while its correlation with the business cycle indicator is not
significant.
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The analysis of within-firm product switching is among the first investigating
the new margins made observable by the recent availability of large-scale micro
data. Although the results are informative, I interpret them as confined to the
sample of the listed firms that is not representative of small or medium-sized firms.
Additionally, the results are for the Great Recession and might not apply to other
business cycles.
This chapter is a further investigation of the product dynamics of multiproduct
firms and is therefore related to Chapter 1. The procyclicality of net product entry
is consistent with the procyclical product scope observed in the previous chapter.
Furthermore, with the Compustat data, I investigate the cyclicality of firm markups
for the listed Nielsen firms and find that their markups are countercyclical. I can
improve the current markup measure by using the production-function approach to
markup estimation, as in De Loecker and Warzynski (2012). The authors estimate
the markup using the wedge between a variable input’s expenditure share in revenue
and that input’s output elasticity, which is obtained by estimating the associated
production function.
Beside the business cycle, this chapter also relates product adding and drop-
ping to growth. The data suggests that across- and within- firm reallocations are
both important. Schumpeterian growth models show that firms grow through suc-
cessful innovations– either through creative destruction, own-product improvement
or introducing new products. The theoretical emphasis had largely been on the
creative destruction margin. The large magnitude of the within-firm adjustments,
observed in the new large-scale micro data, calls for further exploration, both in
84
terms of its contribution to growth but also its role in the business cycle.
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Tables and Figures
Table 2.1: Summary Statistics, All the Nielsen Firms
All years Recession years
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Entry 16.28 29.07 15.46 28.36
Exit 18.69 30.52 19.18 30.89
Net Entry -2.41 39.16 -3.72 38.93
Reallocation 34.98 44.94 34.64 44.74
Notes: Notes: Observations are at firm by product group by Scantrack market by year
level. All the rates or ratios are in percentage points.
Table 2.2: Summary Statistics, the Listed Nielsen Firms
All years Recession years
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Entry 14.90 24.17 13.88 22.89
Exit 18.17 24.92 18.14 25.14
Net Entry -3.27 31.79 -4.26 31.31
Reallocation 33.06 37.42 32.02 36.5
Notes: Product switching measures are at the firm by product group by year level. The
sample only keeps the continuing Nielsen listed firms in pairs of years. All the rates or

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2.4: Probability of Adding/Dropping a Product
Dummy(Add)m,grt Dummy(Drop)m,grt
(1) (2) (3) (4)
URrt -0.0013 -0.0001
(0.0009) (0.0008)
Small 0.7201*** 0.7279*** 0.2641*** 0.2775***
(0.0076) (0.0081) (0.0070) (0.0075)
Medium 0.4961*** 0.4997*** 0.6030*** 0.5989***
(0.0073) (0.0075) (0.0070) (0.0070)
Large 0.8721*** 0.8597*** 1.0134*** 1.0037***
(0.0076) (0.0082) (0.0072) (0.0079)
Small× URrt -0.0023** -0.0017*
(0.0009) (0.0009)
Medium× URrt -0.0018* 0.0004
(0.0009) (0.0008)
Large× URrt 0.0002 0.0011
(0.0010) (0.0008)
Product group fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm size fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.5546 0.5546 0.6386 0.6386
Observations 4700177 4700177 4700177 4700177
Notes: ∗p < 0.1, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01. Standard errors are clustered at the Scantrack
market level. “Dummy(Add)” (“Dummy(Drop)”) equals one if any product of the firm
is added (dropped). “Small” if new firm or lagged product scope in logs is in the first
tercile, “Medium” if lagged product scope in logs is in the second tercile, and “Large” if
lagged product scope in logs is in the largest tercile. For firm-level analysis, I identify firms
within the product group by Scantrack market by year cells. The dependent variables are
product scope in logs (columns (1) and (3)) and product scope growth (column (2)). The




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2.6: Net Product Entry, the Listed Nielsen Firms
NetEntrym,gt (1) (2) (3)
URt -0.5044** -0.4981** -0.4988**
(0.2517) (0.2517) (0.2521)
Firm size 0.0228 -0.0581 -0.0781
(2.2219) (2.2233) (2.2535)




Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Product group fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.0805 0.0806 0.0806
Observations 8120 8120 8120
Notes: ∗p < 0.1, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01. Only continuing firms are considered.
The dependent variable is firm-level product net entry rate by product group by year
in percentage points. The net entry rate equals entry minus exit rates. The regressors
are national unemployment rate (UR), the lagged total sales of the listed firms without
distinguishing product types (Firm size), the listed-firms’ lagged Kaplan-Zingales indices
(Financial constraint), and the listed firms’ lagged ratios of the research and development
expenses out of the total sales in percentage points (R&D).
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Table 2.7: Product Reallocation, the Listed Nielsen Firms
Reallocationm,gt (1) (2) (3)
URt -0.1102 -0.1233 -0.0560
(0.2668) (0.2668) (0.2667)
Firm size 1.0489 1.2167 3.1832
(2.3555) (2.3565) (2.3846)




Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Product group fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.2538 0.2542 0.2567
Observations 8120 8120 8120
Notes: ∗p < 0.1, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01. Only continuing firms are considered. The
dependent variable is firm-level product reallocation rate by product group by year in
percentage points. The reallocation rate equals entry plus exit rates. The regressors
are national unemployment rate (UR), the lagged total sales of the listed firms without
distinguishing product types (Firm size), the listed-firms’ lagged Kaplan-Zingales indices
(Financial constraint), and the listed firms’ lagged ratios of the research and development
expenses out of the total sales in percentage points (R&D).
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Table 2.8: Net Product Entry, the Listed Nielsen Firms
NetEntrym,gt (1) (2) (3)
URt -0.4135 -0.4128 -0.4130
(0.2987) (0.2987) (0.2987)
TFP 0.7699 0.7135 0.7159
(1.3862) (1.3873) (1.3879)




Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Product group fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.0805 0.0806 0.0806
Observations 8120 8120 8120
Notes: ∗p < 0.1, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01. Only continuing firms are considered.
The dependent variable is firm-level product net entry rate by product group by year in
percentage points. The net entry rate equals entry minus exit rates. The regressors are
national unemployment rate (UR), the listed firms’ lagged productivity (TFP), the listed-
firms’ lagged Kaplan-Zingales indices (Financial constraint), and the listed firms’ lagged
ratios of the research and development expenses out of the total sales in percentage points
(R&D).
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Table 2.9: Product Reallocation, the Listed Nielsen Firms
Reallocationm,gt (1) (2) (3)
URt -0.4819 -0.4833 -0.4701
(0.3165) (0.3165) (0.3160)
TFP -3.0022** -2.8884** -3.0871**
(1.4692) (1.4701) (1.4684)




Product group fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.2542 0.2546 0.2569
Observations 8120 8120 8120
Notes: ∗p < 0.1, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01. Only continuing firms are considered. The
dependent variable is firm-level product reallocation rate by product group by year in
percentage points. The reallocation rate equals entry plus exit rates. The regressors are
national unemployment rate (UR), the listed firms’ lagged productivity (TFP), the listed-
firms’ lagged Kaplan-Zingales indices (Financial constraint), and the listed firms’ lagged
ratios of the research and development expenses out of the total sales in percentage points
(R&D).
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Table 2.10: Net Product Addition, the Listed Nielsen Firms
NetAdditionm,gt (1) (2) (3)
URt -0.1455 -0.1438 -0.1504
(0.2955) (0.2956) (0.2960)
Firm size -2.2122 -2.2345 -2.4275
(2.6092) (2.6110) (2.6464)




Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Product group fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.0867 0.0868 0.0868
Observations 8120 8120 8120
Notes: ∗p < 0.1, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01. Only continuing firms are considered.
The dependent variable is firm-level product net entry rate by product group by year in
percentage points. The net entry rate equals product addition minus subtraction rates
(all sales-based). The regressors are national unemployment rate (UR), the lagged total
sales of the listed firms without distinguishing product types (Firm size), the listed-firms’
lagged Kaplan-Zingales indices (Financial constraint), and the listed firms’ lagged ratios of
the research and development expenses out of the total sales in percentage points (R&D).
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Table 2.11: Product Sales-based Reallocation, the Listed Nielsen Firms
SalesReallocationm,gt (1) (2) (3)
URt -0.0633 -0.0790 -0.0122
(0.2969) (0.2969) (0.2969)
Firm size -0.8939 -0.6932 1.2573
(2.6215) (2.6225) (2.6547)




Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Product group fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.2160 0.2165 0.2185
Observations 8120 8120 8120
Notes: ∗p < 0.1, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01. Only continuing firms are considered. The
dependent variable is firm-level product reallocation rate by product group by year in
percentage points. The reallocation rate equals product addition plus subtraction rates
(all sales-based). The regressors are national unemployment rate (UR), the lagged total
sales of the listed firms without distinguishing product types (Firm size), the listed-firms’
lagged Kaplan-Zingales indices (Financial constraint), and the listed firms’ lagged ratios of
the research and development expenses out of the total sales in percentage points (R&D).







Firm fixed effects Yes Yes
R2 0.1541 0.1784
Observations 2126 2126
Notes: ∗p < 0.1, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01. The dependent variable is firm-level markup
growth rates in percentage points. The regressors are national unemployment rate (UR)
and the lagged markup in percentage points.
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Product group fixed effects Yes Yes
Region fixed effects Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes
Firm size fixed effects Yes Yes
R2 0.0640 0.0640
Observations 3002664 3002664
Notes: ∗p < 0.1, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01. Standard errors are clustered at the Scantrack
market level. Only continuing firms in 3 consecutive years are considered. The dependent
variable is firm-level product sales growth rate by product group by year by region in
percentage points. The control variable “Reallocation” is the lagged within-firm product
reallocation rate. The other regressor is the regional unemployment rate (UR). A firm is
“Small” if its lagged lagged product scope in logs is in the first tercile, “Medium” if lagged
product scope in logs is in the second tercile, and “Large” if lagged lagged product scope
in logs is in the largest tercile.
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Firm size -4.8903 -4.4985
(3.9973) (3.9564)






Firm fixed effects Yes Yes
Product group fixed effects Yes Yes
R2 0.1858 0.2026
Observations 6504 6504
Notes: ∗p < 0.1, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01. Only continuing firms in 3 consecutive years
are considered. The dependent variable is firm-level product sales growth rate by product
group by year in percentage points. The control variable “Reallocation” is the lagged
within-firm product reallocation rate. The other regressors are national unemployment
rate (UR), the lagged total sales of the listed firms without distinguishing product types
(Firm size), the listed-firms’ lagged Kaplan-Zingales indices (Financial constraint), and
the listed firms’ lagged ratios of the research and development expenses out of the total
sales in percentage points (R&D).
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Product group fixed effects Yes Yes
Region fixed effects Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes
Firm size fixed effects Yes Yes
R2 0.3803 0.3804
Observations 3002664 3002664
Notes: ∗p < 0.1, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01. Standard errors are clustered at the Scantrack
market level. Only continuing firms in 3 consecutive years are considered. The dependent
variable is firm-level product exit rate by product group by year by region in percentage
points. The control variable “Entry” is the lagged within-firm product entry rate, and
“Rivals’ entry” is the lagged weighted product entry rate of the firm’s rivals by their
relative product scope sizes. Another regressor is the regional unemployment rate (UR).
A firm is “Small” if its lagged product scope in logs is in the first tercile, “Medium” if
lagged product scope in logs is in the second tercile, and “Large” if lagged product scope
in logs is in the largest tercile.
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Firm size 1.1302 1.4285
(2.3378) (2.3268)








Firm fixed effects Yes Yes
Product group fixed effects Yes Yes
R2 0.1850 0.1932
Observations 6504 6504
Notes: ∗p < 0.1, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01. Only continuing firms in 3 consecutive years
are considered. The dependent variable is firm-level product exit rate by product group by
year in percentage points. The control variable “Entry” is the lagged within-firm product
entry rate, and “Rivals’ entry” is the lagged weighted product entry rate of the firm’s rivals
by their relative product scope sizes. The other regressors are national unemployment
rate (UR), the lagged total sales of the listed firms without distinguishing product types
(Firm size), the listed-firms’ lagged Kaplan-Zingales indices (Financial constraint), and
the listed firms’ lagged ratios of the research and development expenses out of the total
sales in percentage points (R&D).
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2.8 Appendix
Appendix A. More Empirical Results
A1. All the Nielsen Firms: Product Switching
Table 2.17: Probability of Adding/Dropping a Product
Dummy(Add)m,grt Dummy(Drop)m,grt
(1) (2) (3) (4)
URrt -0.0011 -0.0001
(0.0007) (0.0009)
Small 0.4404*** 0.4427*** 0.3173*** 0.3313***
(0.0074) (0.0074) (0.0079) (0.0086)
Medium 0.5642*** 0.5709*** 0.6341*** 0.6324***
(0.0074) (0.0076) (0.0079) (0.0076)
Large 0.9358*** 0.9267*** 1.0438*** 1.0366***
(0.0078) (0.0081) (0.0081) (0.0087)
Small× URrt -0.0014** -0.0018*
(0.0007) (0.0010)
Medium× URrt -0.0019** 0.0001
(0.0007) (0.0009)
Large× URrt 0.0000 0.0007
(0.0008) (0.0010)
Product group fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm size fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.5309 0.5309 0.6438 0.6438
Observations 4035742 4035742 4035742 4035742
Notes: ∗p < 0.1, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01. Standard errors are clustered at the Scantrack
market level. Only continuing firms are considered. “Dummy(Add)” (“Dummy(Drop)”)
equals one if any product of the firm is added (dropped). “Small” if lagged product scope
in logs is in the first tercile, “Medium” if lagged product scope in logs is in the second
tercile, and “Large” if lagged product scope in logs is in the largest tercile. For firm-level
analysis, I identify firms within the product group by Scantrack market by year cells. The
dependent variables are product scope in logs (columns (1) and (3)) and product scope
growth (column (2)). The main regressor is the regional unemployment rate.
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A2. The Listed Nielsen Firms: Product Entry and Exit Respectively
We have observed that the business cycle and the firm factors can both affect
firms’ net entry and reallocation rates, but their importances differ. The underlying
times series of the net entry and reallocation rates are the firm-level gross product
entry and exit rates. The tables 2.18 and 2.19 report the results using the continuing
listed firms sample.
The entry rates are procyclical, while the exit rates are countercyclical. Both
contribute to the procyclicality of the net entry rates, shown in Table 2.6. In addi-
tion, a higher R&D ratio implies both higher entry and exit rates. Naturally, the
sum of the two, the reallocation rates, also increase when the R&D ratio rises up.
In contrary, the tighter the financial constraint, the higher the entry and exit rates.
So the financial constraint has a negative impact on firms’ reallocation rates.
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Table 2.18: Product Entry, the Listed Nielsen Firms
Entrym,grt (1) (2) (3)
URt -0.3073* -0.3107* -0.2774
(0.1801) (0.1801) (0.1802)
Firm size 0.5359 0.5793 1.5526
(1.5900) (1.5910) (1.6112)




Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Product group fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.1853 0.1854 0.1868
Observations 8120 8120 8120
Notes: ∗p < 0.1, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01. Only continuing firms are considered. The
dependent variable is firm-level product entry rate by product group by year in percentage
points. The regressors are national unemployment rate (UR), the lagged total sales of
the listed firms without distinguishing product types (Firm size), the listed-firms’ lagged
Kaplan-Zingales indices (Financial constraint), and the listed firms’ lagged ratios of the
research and development expenses out of the total sales in percentage points (R&D).
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Table 2.19: Product Exit, the Listed Nielsen Firms
Exitm,grt (1) (2) (3)
URt 0.1971 0.1874 0.2214
(0.1866) (0.1866) (0.1867)
Firm size 0.5130 0.6374 1.6306
(1.6476) (1.6482) (1.6692)




Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Product group fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.1772 0.1777 0.1791
Observations 8120 8120 8120
Notes: ∗p < 0.1, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01. Only continuing firms are considered. The
dependent variable is firm-level product exit rate by product group by year in percentage
points. The regressors are national unemployment rate (UR), the lagged total sales of
the listed firms without distinguishing product types (Firm size), the listed-firms’ lagged
Kaplan-Zingales indices (Financial constraint), and the listed firms’ lagged ratios of the
research and development expenses out of the total sales in percentage points (R&D).
A3.The Listed Nielsen Firms: Product Scope and Sales
As a bridge of Chapter 1 and 2, I investigate the cyclicality and other influential
factors of the list Nielsen firms’ product scope levels. Consistent with the Chapter
1 analysis, the data used in this subsection is firm by product group by region by
year.
As shown in the main context, the listed Nielsen firms have large product scope
on average. From the analysis of Chapter 1, the large firms are the most resilient
in the business cycle: their product scope are acyclical while the medium-sized and
small firms’ product scope are procyclical; at the same time, while the sales of all
the firms are procyclical and decrease in the recession, the large firms experience
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the least sales loss, all else equal.
Table 2.20 reports the regression results for firm product scope, using the
Chapter 1’s firm-level regression specification. The firms’ product scope is acyclical.
The product scope (by product groups and regions) can be affected by firm size,
financial constraint and the R&D ratio. Among these, the positive impact of firm
size is in accordance with the model implication in Chapter 1.
Aside from the firm product scope results, another test that I can conduct is
to look at the firms’ sales cyclicality while controlling for the firm fundamentals.
From Table 2.21, when the unemployment rate increases by 1 point, the firm sales
decreases by -0.02%. Although the adjustment is significant, its magnitude is small
and in line with small correlation between the large firms’ sales and the unem-
ployment rate in Chapter 1. Controlling for the business cycle, firm size, financial
constraint and R&D ratio also affect firms’ sales.
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Table 2.20: Cyclicality of Firms’ Product Scope, the Listed Nielsen Firms
log(PS)m,grt (1) (2) (3)
URrt 0.0018 0.0018 0.0018
(0.0022) (0.0023) (0.0022)
Firm size 0.1576*** 0.1582*** 0.1542***
(0.0029) (0.0028) (0.0030)




Product group fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Region fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.1763 0.1767 0.1770
Observations 271135 271135 271135
Notes: ∗p < 0.1, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01. Standard errors are clustered at the Scantrack
market level. The dependent variable is firm product scope by product group by region
by year in logs. The regressors are regional unemployment rate (UR), the lagged total
sales of the listed firms without distinguishing product types or regions (Firm size), the
listed-firms’ lagged Kaplan-Zingales indices (Financial constraint), and the listed firms’
lagged ratios of the research and development expenses out of the total sales in percentage
points (R&D).
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Table 2.21: Cyclicality of Firm Sales, the Listed Nielsen Firms
log(Sales)m,grt (1) (2) (3)
URrt -0.0185** -0.0186** -0.0188**
(0.0089) (0.0088) (0.0087)
Firm size 0.1649*** 0.1665*** 0.1162***
(0.0138) (0.0138) (0.0150)




Product group fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Region fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.1413 0.1417 0.1511
Observations 271135 271135 271135
Notes: ∗p < 0.1, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01. Standard errors are clustered at the Scantrack
market level. The dependent variable is firm sales by product group by region by year in
logs. The regressors are regional unemployment rate (UR), the lagged total sales of the
listed firms without distinguishing product types or regions (Firm size), the listed-firms’
lagged Kaplan-Zingales indices (Financial constraint), and the listed firms’ lagged ratios of
the research and development expenses out of the total sales in percentage points (R&D).
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Appendix B. Data Details
Appendix B1. Standardization of Compustat Firm Names
The table is an extended version of Table 16 in the appendix of Schoenle
(2017).























Appendix B2. Constructing Compustat Variables
The Compustat firm fundamental controls include firm size, financial con-
straint condition, the Research and Development expenses out of the total sales,
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markup and productivity. The Compustat terms used in the data construction are
listed in the following table:




CEQ Ordinary Equity - Total
CHE Cash and Short-Term Investments
COGS Cost of Goods Sold
DLC Debt in Current Liabilities - Total
DLTT Long-Term Debt - Total
DP Depreciation and Amortization
DPACT Depreciation, Depletion and Amortization (Accumulated)
DVC Dividends Common/Ordinary
DVP Dividends - Preferred/Preference
EMP Number of Employees
IB Income Before Extraordinary Items
OIBDP Operating Income Before Depreciation
PPEGT Property, Plant and Equipment - Total
SALE Net Sales
SEQ Total Parent Stockholders’ Equity
TXDB Deferred Taxes
XRD Research and Development Expense
• Firm size is defined as log(SALE).
• The financial constraint condition is measured by the Kaplan-Zingales index,
proposed in Kaplan and Zingales (1997). The index formula is
Kaplan-Zingalesm,t = 1.002CFm,t − 39.368Dididentsm,t − 1.315Cashm,t
+ 3.139Leverage+ 0.283Qm,t
(2.6)
The first term CF is the the ratio of cash flow (IBm,t+DPm,t) over lagged total
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assets (ATm,t−1), the second term is the ratio of total dividends (DV Cm,t +
DV Pm,t) over lagged total assets (ATm,t−1). The third term is the ratio of
cash and short-term investments (CHEm,t) over lagged total assets (ATm,t−1).
The fourth term is the leverage, defined as the ratio of total debts (DLTTm,t+
DLCm,t) over total equity (SEQm,t). The last term is Tobin’s Q, defined as
the ratio of the market value of equity from CRSP minus the book value of
equity and deferred taxed (CEQm,t+TXDBm,t) over the total assets (ATm,t).
• The research and development expense ratio is the research and development
expense over the total sales, i.e. XRD/SALE.
• Markup is defined as the price to cost margin using the Compustat terms
SALE and COGS, following Gorodnichenko and Weber (2016). Specially,
markup equals (SALE − COGS)/COGS.
• Productivity is the Solow residual (Total factor productivity, or TFP) esti-
mated using the semi-parametric method of Olley and Pakes (1996). The
Implementation of the estimation is from İmrohoroğlu and Tüzel (2014). The
Compustat terms used in the estimation are AT, CAPX, DP, DPACT, EMP,
OIBDP, PPEGT, and SALE. The Compustat data is supplemented with price
indices: wages, GDP deflater (for output) and investment deflater (for invest-
ment, capital).
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Table 2.24: Summary Statistics, the Listed Nielsen Firms
Mean Std. Dev.
Firm size 8.22 2.12
Financial constraint 1.72 35.79
R&D 2.66 4.90
TFP -0.09 0.62
Markup growth -0.06 35.19
Notes: The Compustat observations are at firm by product group by year level. The
sample only keeps the continuing Nielsen listed firms in pairs of years. All the rates or
ratios are in percentage points.
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